




The Dissertation Committee for Seung Rae Lee
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:
Three Essays on International Trade
Committee:





Three Essays on International Trade
by
Seung Rae Lee, B.A. Eco.; M.S. Eco.
DISSERTATION
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
May 2012
To my beloved parents, Jaimin Lee and Hyosun Koh,
and my heavenly grandmother
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank my supervisors, Dean Corbae and Jason Abrevaya, for their
guidance and support, and the members of my dissertation committee – David
Kendrick, Kripa Freitas, and Andrew Glover – for their time and valuable advices.
I would also like to thank to Professor Natalia Ramondo for opening my eyes into
the field of international trade.
I am indebted to my family for their loyal support and everlasting love. I am
very thankful to Jaehong Park, Sanghyun Hwang, Daehyun Kim, Joon Ro, Jae-Eun
Namkoong, Seungjae Park, Othon Moreno, and Sunjoo Hwang for their support
and friendship in graduate school. I would also like to show my gratitude to Jihye
Choi for her continuous support and encouragement during the completion of this
dissertation. And finally, I would like to express my profound appreciation to my
dear friends in Korea for their support.
v
Three Essays on International Trade
Publication No.
Seung Rae Lee, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2012
Supervisors: P. Dean Corbae
David Kendrick
This dissertation consists of three essays in international trade. The first
chapter analyzes integration strategies of Korean firms that involve producing final
products and providing post-production services for serving geographically separate
foreign markets: high-income and low-income countries. I present a model in which
heterogeneous firms must provide services for products through their subsidiaries in
host countries, but can produce output in different locations. The model shows that
the firm’s equilibrium decision depends on its own productivity level and economic
variables that affect production location and providing services. Using plant- and
firm-level data of Korean firms, the empirical analysis provides the results that
support the model’s predictions.
The second chapter analyzes the effects of regional economic integrations
on investment patterns among Korean multinational firms. Using Korea’s middle-
income status, we develop a model in which heterogeneous firms in a middle-income
country decide on the optimal FDI strategies for serving different regions: a devel-
oped (EEA) and a developing (AFTA) trade integrated regions. Following reduced
trade costs between countries inside the trade integrated region, our model predicts
that integrating into a regional economic zone affects firms with low productivity
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levels to enter the region via complex FDI strategies. Depending on the size of the
region, however, complex FDI strategies differ such that firms investing in devel-
oped region tend to undertake local and export sales to the third country, whereas
firms investing in developing region are more likely to engage in not only local and
export sales to the third country, but also export sales to the parent country. The
empirical analysis confirms the effect of different regional economic integrations on
the strategy of firms with different productivity levels.
The last chapter examines the conditions under which technology spillovers
through workers’ movement occur between foreign affiliates in the host country and
determine whether such spillovers can affect the exporters’ decisions to switch their
strategies to serve foreign markets via FDI. Developing a simple two-period duopoly
model, I find that the occurrence of technology spillovers is dependent on firm and
host country characteristics such that spillovers are more likely to arise when firms
have similar technology capabilities and in countries that incur low cost of training
local workers. Under these circumstances, exporters are more likely to switch to
FDI for serving foreign markets. However, I find that transport costs of goods have
ambiguous effect on the occurrence of spillovers and thus, do not play a marginal
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Chapter 1
Post-Production Services and Optimal Integration
Strategies for the Multinational Firm
1.1 Introduction
Recent literature on international trade has examined the role of product
quality as a determinant of trade patterns (Schott (2004); Hallak (2006); Crinò and
Epfiani (2009)). These studies have concentrated on testing Linder’s theory (1961),
who was the first to argue that rich (poor) countries have a comparative advantage
in producing high-quality (low-quality) goods and have relatively higher demand
for these goods.1 For example, Hallak (2006) provides support for the Linder’s
theory by developing an empirical framework to identify the effect of quality on
the demand-side by studying the relationship between a country’s income and its
aggregate demand for quality. On the other hand, showing a positive correlation
between export unit values and exporter per capita income and capital endowments,
Schott (2004) supported Linder’s (1961) theory predicting the impact of quality on
the supply-side. These works have contributed to the trade literature by examining
product quality to explain bilateral trade between countries with similar income lev-
els. Notably, however, these studies have been restricted to developed countries and
cannot adequately explain trade between heterogeneous countries, particularly out-
ward foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from developing countries to developed
1Based on the assumption that the consumer’s preference for the quality is non-homothetic with
respect to per capita income, these literature have found that countries with similar incomes per
capita exhibit large volumes of bilateral trade. See Murphy et al. (1989) and Matsuyama (2000)
on the role of non-homothetic preferences on product quality in international trade.
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countries.
To study firms’ strategies to serve global markets, this paper uses micro-level
data from Korea, a developing country that have undergone remarkable growth in
outward FDI in last few decades. As noted, developed countries have superior
technology and rich endowments to produce and upgrade product quality to serve
foreign markets. What kind of measures, then, can multinational firms in developing
countries take to enter foreign markets and compete against high-quality products?
In this work, I start to explore the idea that improving post-production services for
products may be a tactical strategy for such firms.
Much evidence exists to support the fact that providing post-production ser-
vices is a crucial strategic decision for firms, specifically firms in emerging countries
seeking to extend foreign market share. For example, Hyundai Motors, one of the
largest multinational firms in Korea, is known worldwide for its post-production
services. By providing high-quality service that is distinguishable from other for-
eign automobile makers producing high-quality vehicles, Hyundai has shown steady
growth in its market share worldwide. Computer Aided System Corporation (CAS),
a small Korean multinational firm that manufactures electronic scales is also known
for leading market share in Eastern Europe by providing superior post-production
services.2 Although recent evidence indicates that the quality of services can be
a comparative advantage for firms serving foreign markets, traditional theories of
international trade have neglected to study the role service quality plays in firms’
strategic decisions.
2Post-production services provided by Korean firms mostly involve repair and maintenance ser-
vices after production. For example, Hyundai offers America’s best warranty, which provides free
repair and maintenance services for 10 years or 100,000 miles and 24/7 roadside assistance, whereas
CAS provides services by establishing numerous service centers and hiring service agents to provide
maintenance service everyday (Dong-A Business Review, 2009).
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Recently, the literature has incorporated post-production services into firms’
decisions to serve foreign markets, specifically examining what determines a firm’s
choice of providing services through outsourcing or providing services themselves
through FDI. To analyze the distribution of final products (an important exam-
ple of post-production services), recent theoretical work has developed international
duopoly models to formalize the role of distribution costs as a determinant of firms’
choices on providing services in foreign markets (Qiu (2010); Ishikawa et al. (2010)).
These models share two important features. First, domestic and foreign firms com-
pete in the domestic market to provide services. Second, firms’ FDI decisions depend
not only on distribution costs, but also on plant setup costs. With high distribu-
tion costs, foreign firms prefer engaging in FDI; however, conditional on plant setup
costs, foreign firms will either merge with domestic firms (cross-border M&A) or
establish their own (greenfield FDI).3
In contrast to studying one aspect of firms’ business activities to serve global
markets, this paper studies the optimal strategies of multinational firms in a middle-
income country to integrate production and post-production services in different
locations. Then, I examine how firms provide services through different types of
service managers for serving different foreign markets: high-income and low-income
countries.4 To organize the discussions of firms’ decisions to produce and provide
services of products in foreign markets, I introduce service quality differences into
3In a related work, Nocke and Yeaple (2007) stress the importance of marketing and distribution
costs in affecting firms’ foreign market entry modes. Developing a general equilibrium model with
heterogeneous firms, they show that the source of firm heterogeneity in mobile (technology) and
immobile (marketing) capabilities plays a key role in firms’ decisions to choose between cross-border
M&A and greenfield FDI.
4My approach to studying firms that provide post-production services through service man-
agers are consistent with findings from the strategic management literature, which emphasizes the
importance of service managers providing services through regular visits, routine conversations,
promotions with buyers (Parasuraman et al. (1985); Anand and Delios (2002); Rouleau (2005)).
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the heterogeneous firms trade model developed by Grossman et al. (2006), that an-
alyze a complementary strategy of heterogeneous firms that choose different organi-
zational forms to integrate producing intermediate goods and conducting assembly
operations in one or more locations.
I develop a modification of the Grossman et al.’s framework to explain strate-
gies of multinational firms on integrating production and post-production services.
I introduce a one-stage production model in which firms investing in and serving
the North can save transport costs, whereas producing domestically and shipping
to the North conserves production and plant setup costs. Alternatively, investing
in and serving the South saves both production and transport costs and shipping
products from the home country conserves the plant setup cost.
After production, firms either hire local managers or bring home service
managers to provide services. Local service managers provide services effectively in
their local market, whereas home service managers have disadvantages in exerting
their abilities abroad, including limited local market knowledge or cultural barriers.
Firms, therefore, choose service managers with high-abilities to provide services
by considering the degree to which the managers are internationally mobile. The
model shows that the decision a firm makes regarding production location depends
on industry characteristics, such as fixed investment costs of setting up the plant,
transport costs, and the firm’s productivity level. On the other hand, the firm’s
decision to provide services depends on country characteristics, particularly the
manager’s ability and the degree of international mobility.
Given that firms’ optimal strategies to serve foreign markets are likely to
differ based on the market size relative to the home country, I estimate the firm’s
strategy model separately for firms serving high-income countries and firms serving
low-income countries. The empirical findings are consistent with the predictions
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of the theoretical model. For firms that enter high-income countries, their choice
of strategies depends on the transport cost, which is a crucial element for firms’
production location decisions and, their productivity levels. For firms investing in
low-income countries, their choice of strategies depends on the degree to which home
service managers are international mobile, which plays an important role in firms’
decisions to provide services.
This paper makes notable departures from recent trade literature on post-
production services and firms’ integration strategies. In contrast to recent theoretical
work on post-production services (Ishikawa et al. (2010)), this paper focuses on three
concepts. First, I focus on maintenance and repair services as the firm’s primary
activity when providing post-production services in global markets. Second, firms
must provide these services by establishing their own facilities abroad. Hence, rather
than studying firms’ choice between outsourcing and FDI, this paper examines the
determinants that affect firms’ choice of international organization forms in different
locations. Third, service managers provide post-production services in the company.
These managers exert their abilities, which differ across countries, to demonstrate
the service quality of final products.
On the other hand, in contrast to Grossman et al. (2006), this paper exam-
ines two additional phenomena. First, I study firms’ integration strategies to pro-
duce final outputs and provide post-production services on their own. In the model,
I incorporate firm heterogeneity as a determinant of horizontal and service FDI.
Second, I study the decisions that firms headquartered in a middle-income country
make to serve geographically separate foreign markets. Dividing the present study
into two cases in which firms serve each type of foreign market, this paper aims to
examine the determinants of firms’ optimal strategies when facing different markets.
This paper makes two main contributions to the trade and FDI literatures.
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First, by adding the firm’s decision to provide post-production services to its pro-
duction location decision for serving foreign markets, I introduce a new pattern of
FDI – service FDI – in equilibrium. Second, in the line with Aw and Lee (2008), I
introduce firms in a middle-income country that seek to serve global markets. In con-
trast to their model, which focuses on the effects of firm heterogeneity on Taiwanese
firms’ production location choices between high- and low-income countries, I con-
centrate on Korean firms’ integration strategies related to post-production services
when serving high- and low-income countries separately. This provides implications
for how firms choose an optimal integration strategy when they serve the market
from the perspective of a rich country and from the perspective of a poor country.
To my knowledge, this concept has not been studied. Given Korean’s income sta-
tus, one of my goals is to provide insights into different forms of FDI that firms in
a developing country can choose if they seek to serve developed countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
recent FDI activities among Korean firms and describes the plant-level data used
for the empirical estimation. Section 3 develops a model illustrating firms’ choices
for different integration strategies. Section 4 describes how I construct the variables
from the data set for the econometric analysis. Section 5 contains the empirical
results of testing predictions from the model, and Section 6 concludes and proposes
future work.
1.2 Data Facts
This section presents recent activities of Korean multinational firms world-
wide using plant-level data from 2002 through 2009. This plant-level data includes
the full list of Korean worldwide investments during the sample period. All foreign
affiliates abroad in which Korean firms hold at least a 10% ownership share are in-
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cluded in the sample. The data was obtained from the Overseas Direct Investment
Statistics from the Export-Import Bank of Korea. While the Export-Import Bank
of Korea has collected data officially on Korean affiliates abroad since 2002, these
figures are restricted from the public by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance of
Korea for confidentiality reasons.
This plant-level data are very useful in that they provide information on in-
dividual foreign affiliates that are disaggregated by industry sectors and destination
country in a given year. The most interesting feature of the data is that they not
only provide information on affiliates’ balance sheets, but also on total sales divided
by: (i) sales made from the local market, (ii) sales made from exporting back to
the parent country, and (iii) sales made from exporting to third countries.5 With
information on affiliate sales, it is possible to distinguish plants based on whether
they engage in horizontal, vertical, or export-platform FDI.
The data also provide information on the employment of each foreign af-
filiate, divided by the worker’s nationality and occupation. Decomposed into em-
ployees from home country and host country, the data provide occupations, which
are divided into top managers, middle managers, service managers, and production
workers.6 The data therefore show how Korean firms with different forms of FDI
do business with various types of managers and production workers worldwide.
Table 1.1 presents the distribution of Korean multinational firms in manu-
facturing industries that engage in specific FDI type to serve foreign markets (third
5In particular, sales made by each foreign affiliates can be divided within each category into
sales to other foreign affiliates of Korean firms or foreign joint ventures and sales to unaffiliated
customers.
6According to the data, top managers are defined as managers delegated from headquarters to
appoint the overall performance of affiliates, whereas middle managers are defined as managers
in charge of supervising production workers and, specifically, in charge of contracting with local
production workers and sales of the products. Service managers are defined as managers outside
the production line who are in charge of after-service of the products.
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Table 1.1: New Korean facilities between 2002 and 2009
High-income countries Low-income countries
Horizontal FDI Service FDI Horizontal FDI Service FDI
% of local employees 0.952 0.881 0.969 0.911
production 0.719 0 0.867 0
service 0.273 0.976 0.131 0.935
% of Korean employees 0.048 0.119 0.031 0.089
production 0.121 0 0.206 0
service 0.169 0.009 0.46 0.714
Production location
% of firms in specific FDI type 52.9 47.1 85.7 14.3
Post-production services
% of firms (local service managers) 94.2 97.6 49.1 46.9
% of firms (Korean service managers) 1.7 0.8 45.5 48.3
affiliate size 133.53 48.53 296.14 105.21
# of entry firms 442 1198
Note: High-income and low-income countries are divided according to GNI per capita, calculated using the
World Bank Atlas Method, with respect to the income-level of Korea in a given year.
row) and the employee demographic in their local subsidiaries that were established
during the sample period (first two rows). Firms are divided based on the purpose
of investment and by income-level of destination countries relative Korea in order
to show how they use their subsidiaries and organize employees to serve different
foreign markets.
In the table, horizontal FDI is defined as a firms’s investment in a foreign
production facility that is designed to serve consumers in the foreign market. In
plant-level data, it involves firms that use their facilities to make sales only from the
local market by producing output through local production workers. On the other
hand, service FDI is defined as firm’s investment in a foreign service facility that
is designed to provide post-production services of products in the foreign market.
In the dataset, it involves firms that use facilities to make sales only from the local
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market with products that are produced and shipped from Korea.7 In contrast to
firms that undertake horizontal FDI, these firms do not include any of production
workers, but only with service managers.
The table shows that when Korean firms invest in foreign production facil-
ities to serve local markets, they include not only production workers to produce
outputs, but also service managers to provide post-production services. In partic-
ular, the table shows that firms have different approach to service management in
different markets. When serving high-income countries, most of Korean firms tend
to employ service managers from host countries, whereas firms in low-income coun-
tries are more likely to either employ service managers from host countries or send
managers from headquarters to provide services in local markets.
The most distinguishable feature of Korean multinational firms from the ta-
ble is that there exist large number of firms that invest in subsidiaries that make
sales from the local market without producing goods in their host countries; in par-
ticular, the table shows that nearly half of new facilities established in high-income
countries are not designed to be involved in production facilities, but rather in ser-
vice facilities (third row). These stylized facts are consistent with the theoretical
model which introduces a service FDI strategy for heterogeneous firms.
7Plant-level data provide information on an affiliate’s imports from the local market, Korea,
and third countries, which can be divided within each category into imports from other Korean
affiliates or from unaffiliated suppliers. Investigating imports made from affiliates that are designed
to provide post-production services, I find that in both high- and low-income countries, new affiliates
import products mostly from their headquarters in Korea. (On average, 98.6% of imports were from
headquarters for affiliates in high-income countries whereas 94.9% account for affiliates’ imports
made from headquarters that are located in low-income countries.)
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1.3 Theoretical Framework
This section develops a simple model in which firms serving global markets
face decisions regarding where to integrate production and services and how to
provide services through different types of service managers. To capture the fact
that many Korean multinational firms choose various strategies based on different
markets, I divide the analysis into two cases to study the determinants of firms’
choices when they enter high- and low-income countries separately.
Firms in the Home produce final outputs and provide their services in for-
eign markets: North (n) or South (s). Each firm produces a differentiated variety.






0 < ρ < 1 (1.1)
where n is mass of varieties available to consumers, indexed by ω; x(ω) is consump-
tion of variety; and q(ω) is service quality of variety ω, as perceived by the consumer;
and ρ is a measure of substitutability. Each variety is therefore a Cobb-Douglas bun-
dle of physical quantity and perceived service quality.8 Consumers maximize utility





where y is the exogenously given per capita income. Solving consumer’s maximiza-





8Perceived service quality is defined as the consumer’s assessment of the overall excellence or
superiority of the service (Zeithaml, 1998). Incorporating perceived service quality into the utility
function implies that consumers rely on their expectation of services that will be provided by each
variety and choose the brand that will fulfill their expectation.
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where σ = 1/1 − ρ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties; R = Ny
is a national income with N as exogenously given population of a country; and P
is the ideal price index of the country.9 To capture the role of service managers, I
assume that consumer’s perceived service-quality takes the following form:
q = λα(z) α(z) > 0, α′(z) > 0 (1.4)
where λ ∈ (1,∞) is the true service quality of variety and α(z) is a function capturing
the exogenous skill-level (z) of service managers.10 This form therefore indicates
that consumer’s perceived service-quality is affected by true service quality of the
product and the manager’s ability to demonstrate its quality to consumers.11
On the production side, a continuum of firms exist in the home country
that differ in their productivity levels indexed by θ.12 A firm uses only labor to
produce variety ω. Firm technology is represented by the constant marginal cost
of production, is assumed to be mobile internationally, and can be replicated by its
own foreign affiliate. The unit variable cost of firm with productivity level θ that
serves foreign markets by producing in country k is denoted by Ck:






1−σ . Although P is endogenous to the industry, firms treat it as
exogenous because their size is negligible relative to the size of the industry.
10λ implies inner service value of the product, for example, a 10-year service warranty for an
automobile. Alternatively, I assume that the skill-level of service managers implies the manager’s
ability to demonstrate and perform the service value of the product, such as communication skills
or other specific skills related to providing product maintenance and repair services. The value of
service quality differs from the physical product quality studied by prior research (Hallak (2006);
Johnson (2010)).
11By assuming that the managerial ability, rather than per capita income, affects the consumer’s
preference for the service quality of products, I do not address the effect of differences in the
income distribution on demands. See Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) and Crinò and Epfiani (2009) for
the analysis of the effect of product quality on the pattern of trade between countries based on
non-homotheticity of preferences.
12This paper assumes that after entering to the industry, a firm draws a labor per unit output
coefficient θ from a known distribution G(θ) and that firms serving foreign buyers have efficient
technology to serve domestic market.
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where wk is the wage-level of production workers in country k and t ≥ 1 is the
melting-iceberg transport cost of shipping products to the destination market. As
in Melitz (2003), the marginal cost is inversely related to firm productivity level
and is independent of service quality. Each country differs in factor prices. The
average hourly wage in Korea is sandwiched between that in developed countries and
developing countries. These stylized facts are consistent with the basic assumption
of the model that wage-level is highest in the North and lowest in the South such
that wn > wh > ws.
13 In addition to variable costs, multinational firms entering a
foreign country via FDI incur the fixed investment costs of setting up plants.
To produce final outputs, firms face two choices for locating their plants.
Firms can produce outputs at home and ship them to the destination market. This
strategy incurs transport costs of shipping the products (t > 1), but saves the
fixed cost of establishing facilities in the foreign country. On the other hand, firms
can establish production facilities in the host country to serve local markets. This
strategy would impose a fixed cost of FDI (f), but conserve transport costs of
shipping products from the headquarters (t = 1).14
If cost differences across countries are the main factor that affects firms’ de-
cisions to choose between different production locations, proximity to consumers is
a crucial element for firms needing to provide post-production services. To provide
services of post-production outputs, therefore, all firms must establish service facil-
13According to LABORSTA, average wage rate per hour for manufacturing between 2002 and
2009 is $16.81 in developed countries (higher-income countries relative to Korea in data set), $11.29
in Korea, and $6.88 in developing countries (lower-income countries relative to Korea in data set).
14Since my primary interest is to study firms’ strategies to serve countries that are richer or
poorer relative to the home country by using two-country model, I exclude the possibility of firms
producing outputs in third countries; for example, possibility of firms producing outputs in the
South (North) and ship them to their service facilities in the North (South) to serve local markets,
with the limited data for the empirical analysis. In the Appendix, however, I discuss for this
possibility.
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ities in the destination market which incur the fixed costs of setting up plants (s).
Firms then hire local managers or bring service managers from headquarters, whose
decision depends on the managerial ability to provide services which is assumed to
be exogenous and differs across countries. Following the idea from Nocke and Yeaple
(2007), service managerial ability takes the following form:
α(z) = max {zk, δzh} for k = n, s (1.6)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the degree of international mobility of managers, capturing the
idea that service managers are more effective in their home country than abroad.15
Given the fact that tertiary education enrollment, which is used to proxy
manager’s ability in trade literature (Antràs et al. (2008)), in Korea lies between
that of developed countries and developing countries, I assume that managerial
ability is highest in the North, lowest in the South and intermediate in Home, i.e.
zn > zh > zs > 1. Figure 1.3 in the Appendix shows the relationship between
the country’s per capita income and service managerial ability, which is measured
by the percentage of agents in the relevant age range enrolled in tertiary education.
Managerial ability differences are also consistent with empirical findings that studied
the role of managers in the company as international skill transfer from developed
to developing countries (Fosfuri et al. (2001); Head and Rice (2002)).
When firms provide services through different types of managers, each firm
bears a fixed cost of managing service managers, which can be interpreted as a fixed
coordination cost in Nocke and Yeaple (2007). Because the service manager’s role is
to demonstrate the service quality of post-production outputs, the cost of managing
15Indeed, Maurin et al. (2002) provided empirical evidence suggesting that domestic firms have
an advantage over foreign firms in marketing activities in their own country. By assuming that
managerial ability to provide service takes the following form, firms will either hire or send high-
ability managers to provide services in the destination market.
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these service managers are not proportional to the products that the company sell.
This is the term “distribution cost” used by Qiu (2010). Instead, I assume that
the management cost is proportional to the managers’ abilities, which are given
exogenously in the model.16
1.3.1 The international organization of production and post-production
services
In this subsection, I will derive firm’s profit from serving the foreign market
as a function of its productivity level and economic factors that affect firm’s decision
on locating production and providing post-production services. Then I turn to the
equilibrium analysis in profit functions of different strategies firms can choose to
serve consumers in high-income and low-income countries, respectively.
Within an industry, profit of a firm i that serves country k is as follows:
Πik = pikxik − Cikxik − Fj,k (1.7)
where Fj,k is the firm’s fixed entry costs consisting of plant setup cost, denoted
by subscript j = H,S (H, for horizontal FDI; S, for service FDI) and the cost of
managing service managers, denoted by subscript k = n, h, s. Solving for the firm’s
profit maximization problem, the optimal price is a constant mark-up (σ/σ − 1 =





16For expositional simplicity, this paper assumes that fixed managing cost takes the following
functional form, w(z) where w(z) > 0, w′(z) > 0, and z is the service manager’s ability which is
heterogeneous across countries.
17Note that marginal cost of production, Cik = wk if firm i serves market k from its local
subsidiary. Alternatively, Cik = wht if this firm produces in the home country then exports to
market k.
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Using country’s demand level and optimal price, the profit of firm i produc-
ing variety to serve country k can be written as a function of firm productivity level
and service quality
Πik = Bk(wk)
1−σθσ−1qik − Fj,k (1.9)
where Bk = (1 − ρ)Rk/(ρP )1−σ. If firm i produces and serves country k via FDI,
then wk = wk. If firm i serves country k by producing in the home country and
export, then wk = wht.
After producing variety, each firm engages in providing post-production ser-
vices. Here, I endogenize service quality to study its relationship with firm pro-
ductivity. This captures the idea that upgrading service quality after production
requires more activities such as fixed cost of opening additional service shops.18 In
particular, following Crinò and Epfiani (2009), I assume that upgrading the service
quality of the product (λ) requires a fixed cost equal to 1ηλ
η, where η > 0 is the











η−1 , λ = Bk(wk)
1−σα(z) (1.10)
where η > 1 by the second-order condition for a maximum. Optimal service quality
implies that, holding other factors constant, more productive firms choose higher
18Recently, studies have analyzed product quality as a source of firm heterogeneity by assuming
that product quality is endogenous (Johnson (2010); Hallak and Sivadasan (2009). This paper
follows their idea by assuming that each firm chooses the level of service quality which incurs
the fixed costs of upgrading. For example, firms can establish an additional service shop or hire
additional managers for maintenance and repair services.
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service quality in all destination markets to which they provide services. The in-
tuition for this result is that only the more productive firms are profitable enough
to pay the additional fixed cost of upgrading service quality. Using optimal service















η−1 − Fj,k (1.12)
Equations (1.11) and (1.12) imply that firm’s profit will differ depending
not only on the firms’ productivity level, but also on the industry and country
characteristics; in particular, marginal costs of production and service managers’
abilities.
Profit function therefore suggests that when making decisions to serve for-
eign markets, firms have four strategies from which to choose. Firms can engage
in horizontal FDI with either home or local service managers, implying that firms
integrate production processes and providing services in a single location by estab-
lishing manufacturing and service facilities. This integration strategy would impose
the highest fixed costs of establishing plants (f + s) and managing different ser-
vice managers, but conserve the transport costs. Alternatively, firms can undertake
service FDI with either of home or local service managers, indicating that firms
produce in the home country and export products to a service facility established
in the destination market. This integration strategy imposes fixed costs of setting
up a service facility (s) and managing different types of service managers, and the
transport costs.
In the following, I will analyze the firms’ optional strategies when they serve
consumers in high-income countries and in low-income countries, respectively. For
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each market, I will examine the determinants of firms’ choices among different strate-
gies that maximize the profit.
1.3.1.1 Firms serving high-income countries






































η−1 − FS,n (1.16)
The first and second strategies (Equations (1.13) and (1.14)) represent hori-
zontal FDI with home service managers and with local service managers to provide
services, respectively. These strategies illustrate the market-access incentives for
a firm serving the North. A firm integrates production and services in the host
country to conserve on transport costs than production costs. The third and fourth
strategies (Equations (1.15) and (1.16)) represent service FDI with home service
managers and with local service managers, respectively. In contrast to horizontal
FDI, relatively low production costs in the Home and low plant setup costs are
key motivations for these firms to undertake service FDI. All of these strategies are
consistent with the stylized facts from Table 1.1.
Now, I compare the profits attainable for a firm with the measure of pro-
ductivity, θ, from different strategies listed above. Given that zn > zh > zs and
δ ∈ (0, 1), it is straightforward to find that the profit from providing services through
local managers dominates the profit from sending home managers under the same
type of FDI strategy. That is, I can eliminate firms’ strategies on providing ser-
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vices by sending home service managers and only consider strategies that involve
local service managers to provide services. With two possible integration strategies:
horizontal FDI and service FDI (ΠHLn ,Π
SL
n ), which integration strategy to choose
depends not only on the firm’s productivity level, but also on the relative magnitudes
of transport costs, fixed costs and relative wage.
Taking strategies underlying Equation (1.14) and (1.16), it is straightforward
to see that as long as transport cost is larger than the wage differentials between
the North and the Home, such that t > wn/wh, horizontal FDI strategy is more
profitable than service FDI strategy at every productivity level, θ, in the absence of
fixed investment costs. Depending on the productivity level and fixed plant setup









ΠHLn (0) < Π
SL
n (0) < 0 (1.18)
Therefore, there exist (unique) thresholds θ1n and θ
2
n such that firms with
productivity θ ∈ (0, θ1n) will not enter the foreign market via FDI; firms with pro-
ductivity θ ∈ (θ1n, θ2n) engage in service FDI with local managers; and firms with
productivity θ > θ2n engage in horizontal FDI with local managers.
19 This result is
consistent with Helpman et al. (2004) model that more productive firms can afford
to pay higher fixed investment costs to produce a high volume of products in the
host country, whereas less productive firms export. Our model indicates, however,
19Because all profit functions are continuous with respect to firm productivity level (θ), I can
also use the intermediate value theorem to prove that there exist unique threshold θ that cuts off
two profit functions. Further, in the Appendix, Figure 1.4 depicts the operating profits attainable
from possible integration strategies, for different levels of productivity, in different locations.
18
that more productive firms pay higher fixed costs to upgrade service quality, whereas
less productive firms also participate in upgrading the service quality of products
that are imported from headquarters by establishing service facilities in the host
country.
On the other hand, as long as transport cost is smaller than the wage dif-
ferential between the North and the Home, such that (t ∈ (1, wn/wh)), it is clear
that choosing service FDI strategy is more profitable than choosing horizontal FDI









ΠHLn (0) < Π
SL
n (0) < 0 (1.20)
In this case, a unique threshold θ3n exists such that firms with productivity
θ ∈ (0, θ3n) will not enter the foreign market via FDI, whereas firms with productivity
θ > θ3n engage in service FDI with local managers. In other words, when serving
countries that incur relatively low transport cost, firms will either not enter the
market or engage in service FDI, and will never choose to undertake horizontal FDI.
In contrast to prior trade literature that focused on examining FDI flows between
Northern countries or from North to South, this model proposes that if FDI flows
from South to North, then firms’ activities are affected largely by the transport cost.
Given the same FDI strategy, with large managerial ability differentials be-
tween the North and the Home, firms find it more profitable to provide services
with local service managers when serving high-income countries. However, if trans-
port costs are sufficiently high, the most productive firms will choose horizontal
FDI strategy, whereas less productive firms will choose service FDI strategy and the
19
least productive firms will not enter the market via FDI. Alternatively, if transport
costs are sufficiently low, firms at every productivity level will not choose horizontal
FDI strategy. Instead, more productive firms will undertake service FDI strategy,
whereas less productive firms will not enter the market.
1.3.1.2 Firms serving low-income countries






































η−1 − FS,s (1.24)
Consistent with previous subsection, first two strategies (Equations (1.21)
and (1.22)) indicate integrating production and service in the South with different
types of service managers, whereas last two strategies (Equations (1.23) and (1.24))
indicate integrating business activities in different locations and involving different
types of managers in the service department.
Comparing the profits attainable for a firm with different productivity levels
from different strategies, in contrast to serving high-income countries, firms have to
make a decision on providing services with different types of managers. In particular,
depending on the degree of international mobility, it is clear that as long as the degree
of international mobility is higher than the managerial ability differential between
the South and Home, such that (δ ∈ (zs/zh, 1)), firms will find it more profitable
to send home service managers than hiring local service managers within the same
type of FDI strategy. Alternatively, as long as the degree of international mobility
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is lower than the managerial ability differential between South and Home, such that
(δ ∈ (0, zs/zh)), the profit from providing services through local service managers
dominates the profit from sending home managers under the same FDI strategy.
For each country, therefore, which FDI strategy to choose depends on the firm’s
productivity level and the fixed plant setup costs.
Given that wn > wh > ws and t > 1, it is straightforward to see that firms are
more profitable to choose horizontal FDI strategy than service FDI strategy at every
productivity level, θ, in the absence of fixed costs. Depending on plant setup costs, it
can be seen that the most productive firms will bear high fixed costs of establishing
manufacturing and service facilities in the South and produce varieties with low
marginal cost, whereas less productive firms will export products to their service
facilities abroad. Figure 1.5 in the Appendix depict the profits attainable for firms
with different levels of productivity in countries with a low degree of international
mobility (Fig. 1.5a) and in countries with a high degree of international mobility
(Fig. 1.5b).
Figure 1.5 shows that in both types of countries, more productive firms will
undertake horizontal FDI strategy, whereas less productive firms will choose service
FDI strategy and the least productive firms will not enter the foreign market via
FDI. It is the measure of service managerial ability that affects firms to choose
between different strategies. In particular, the model shows that depending on the
degree of mobility between countries, firms will provide services with local service
managers in locations with low mobility, whereas send home service managers in
countries with high mobility from Home.
To summarize, firms with different productivity level will choose different
strategies to serve global markets, where more productive firms will choose FDI
whereas less productive firms stay Home. Among FDI firms, their optimal strate-
21
gies, however, differ depending on which market they are targeting to. In particular,
when firms serve the North, the model predicts that their strategies are concerned
primarily with integrating production and service in different locations, such that
transport costs and their own productivity level play an important role in firms’
decision. Alternatively, when firms enter the South, the model predicts that firms’
strategies are concerned primarily with providing services. Depending on the degree
to which home service managers are mobile between countries, firms choose different
strategies to serve different foreign markets. In each location, based on the plant
setup costs, firms choose optimal integration strategies on the basis of their produc-
tivity level. The sorting of strategies by firms’ productivity levels and industry and
country characteristics provides the building block for the empirical specification
presented in next sections.
1.4 Data
The theoretical framework presented in the previous section suggests that
multinational firms choose different strategies when they serve different foreign mar-
kets. The sorting of firms doing business in high-income or low-income country
based on their productivity level depends on industry and country characteristics:
in particular, transport costs and the degree of international mobility. The following
analysis illustrates the impact of these economic factors on firms’ optimal strategies
by using a sample of Korean multinational firms.
1.4.1 Data Analysis
To test predictions of firms’ optimal strategies in different foreign markets
based on the model, this paper requires data that vary across industry sectors and
countries. Specifically, data must fall into the following categories: showing cross-
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border activities of foreign affiliates and representing characteristics of parent firms,
industry sectors, and host countries. As noted in Section 1.2, this paper uses plant-
level data from Korean multinational firms from 2002 through 2009. This dataset
provides information on individual foreign affiliates doing business in host countries
including each company’s balance sheet, date of establishment, sales and imports
from different markets, ownership, and composition of employments.
Since data specify the owner of each affiliate through its unique firm identifi-
cation number, I also use parent firm-level data for the analysis, which was obtained
from the Financial Supervisory Service of Korea and the Korea Information System
(KIS) database of the Korea Investor’s Service Co., Ltd. This data include all Ko-
rean firms registered as a corporation in different industries and contain detailed
information of interest, including balance sheets, profit and loss statements, sales
from domestic production and exports, total output, status on FDI, and the com-
position of employment. Each firm is classified by the Korean Standard Industrial
Classifications (KSIC), which are defined by the Korea National Statistical Office.
Because firm-level data itself do not provide information on firms’ foreign affiliates,
this paper merges firm-level data from KIS with plant-level data from the Export-
Import Bank of Korea.
The theoretical model studies firm strategies to enter foreign markets by
integrating production processes and post-production services. For the econometric
analysis, therefore, I will consider firms in the manufacturing industry using the
three-digit KSIC level. Then, among firms in the manufacturing industry, I will
use observations of firms that established foreign affiliates abroad between 2002
and 2009. In a related work that studied serving foreign markets through FDI, a
substantial body of work exists that examine firms’ incentives to form cross-border
mergers and acquisitions with local firms or foreign firm’s affiliates as their entry
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mode. However, because my model focuses on firms’ integration strategies of entry,
observations only include firms that invest independently in their affiliates abroad.20
Further, because my primary interest is to study the strategy firms take to
serve local consumers, FDI firms that established affiliates abroad to make sales
by exporting products back to headquarters or to third countries are excluded. To
examine Korean firm activities in different foreign markets, I decompose destina-
tion countries by developed and developing countries (relative to Korea) based on
their income-level measured by real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita from
World Development Indicators, 2010. After eliminating observations to make the
sample size consistent with the model, the number of firms discovered for analysis is
1,516, with 372 observations from high-income countries and 1,144 from low-income
countries.21
1.4.2 Variables
In this section, I discuss the definition of strategies used in the empirical
setting and provide detailed information on the variables for the econometric anal-
ysis. Dependent variables are firm strategies to integrate production and service
in different locations and provide post-production services with different types of
service managers in the host country. Because this paper only observes each firm’s
20Plant-level data contain information on whether a foreign affiliate is established through inde-
pendent investment by parent firms, through joint venture with other firms, or through purchasing
from other firms, as well as parent firms’ share of equity investment. To make observations consis-
tent with the model, I include firms that enter foreign markets through independent FDI or firms
that have 100% equity investment in their foreign affiliates abroad.
21Results using the entire sample of new FDI firms between 2002 and 2009 are very similar to
those reported in Section 1.5 because horizontal investments dominate the sample. Among FDI
firms during the sample period, horizontal FDI account for 86% of the observations, whereas vertical
FDI account for 4%, export-platform FDI for 2%, and complex FDI (which denotes firm activity of
engaging in multiple types of FDI), account for 8% of the sample. Results using the entire sample
are available on request.
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strategy through the composition of employments in subsidiaries, rather than its
profits from different types of FDI, I construct binary variables to capture firms’
decisions on production location and providing services. Then, binary choice model
will be used to estimate the probability that a firm chooses a specific strategy type.
To capture firms’ decisions on integrating production and service abroad,
I construct a dummy variable, manu, which is equal to 1 if firm’s affiliate makes
sales from the local market by producing outputs through local production workers,
whereas zero if affiliate makes sales from the local market without employing any
local production workers, but only imports products from the headquarters. On
the other hand is firm activity to provide post-production services through different
types of managers. In particular, a dummy variable, local, is equal to 1 if firm’s
affiliate only includes local managers in the service department and zero otherwise.
Because observations include firms that engage in horizontal FDI or service
FDI, a binary variable capturing firm’s integration decision, manu, takes a value 1
if firms engage in horizontal FDI and zero if undertake service FDI. Firms’ decisions
to provide services, however, are complicated. In particular, the dataset indicates
that most of subsidiaries either include local managers or none to provide services
in high-income countries, whereas they include either of local and Korean managers
or none in low-income countries. The binary variable, local, therefore, takes a value
of 1 if the affiliate includes only local managers to provide services, otherwise zero
in the regression for high-income countries. In contrast, I reduce the sample size to
firms that include either local or Korean service managers and construct the same
binary variable, local, which is equal to 1 if the affiliate employs only local service
managers and zero if it employs only Korean service managers in the specification
for low-income countries.22
22This result is a loss of only 4.9% of firms investing in low-income countries. Further, according
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The key explanatory variables used for the analysis are firm productivity
level, transport cost, and the degree to which service managers are internationally
mobile. To measure firm productivity, this paper uses labor productivity rather
than total factor productivity. This is because the theoretical model assumes labor
includes only input to produce the final outputs, with information on capital flow or
stock not available in the dataset.23 For industry characteristics, the model predicts
that the transport cost plays a key role in the firm’s decision to choose between
different integration strategies when entering high-income countries. Because data
on transport cost are difficult to obtain, prior trade literature has turned to indirect
measures of transport cost using proxies such as distance measured by using the
great circle distance between national capitals of the home and destination country
and ad-valorem shipping costs calculated as trade partners’ CIF/FOB ratio.24
When using distance as a proxy for transport cost, however, it also proxies
for the technology transfer between trading countries. For example, Keller (2002)
examined the geographic distance between countries as a determinant of technology
diffusion between countries. He found evidence that knowledge spillover is localized
geographically such that productivity effects decline with the geographic distance
between sender and recipient countries. Alternatively, the value of using CIF/FOB
ratio as a proxy for transport cost has been questioned. Indeed, Hummels and Lu-
to plant-level data, top and middle managers in the organization are not directly related to the
production process or providing service, which are the main interests of the paper. Therefore, the
composition of top and middle managers varies for each affiliate in constructing the dependent
variables; still, all affiliates include either or both top and middle managers.
23Following Aw and Lee (2008), I compute labor productivity as [(lnQ − lnQ) − (lnL − lnL)]
where lnQ and lnL are the industry mean levels of the log of total revenue plus net inventory
change and log of total employment.
24According to the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, exporters report trade flows exclusive
of freight and insurance (Free On Board), whereas importers report flows inclusive of freight and
insurance (Cost, Insurance, and Freights). With the data, many researchers measured trade costs by
comparing the difference of the valuation of the same flow reported by both exporter and importer
(Brainard (1997); Helpman et al. (2004); Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006))
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govskyy (2006) used data from IMF Direction of Statistics to investigate whether
CIF/FOB ratio is usable by comparing their levels and variation to directly mea-
sured transport costs for the U.S. and New Zealand. In their study, they found
that CIF/FOB ratios between countries are not useful to measure cross-commodity
variation.
Instead of using data constructed from the matched partner technique, this
paper follows Tekin-koru (2009) on calculating tariff rate as a measure of transport
costs by using data from UNCTAD-TRAINS assembled by the Ultimate Trade Bar-
rier Catalog. The data include information on tariff rates and trade data using the
six-digit HS industry level for 103 countries. Here, I compute unweighted averages
using the five-digit SITC industry level and map these figures into the three-digit
KSIC industry level by using Trade Statistics provided by the Korea International
Trade Association.25
The key explanatory variables also include the degree to which service man-
agers are internationally mobile from the home to the destination country. In the
model, the degree of mobility plays an important role in firms’ strategies to provide
post-production services when serving low-income countries. Because this paper is
the first to empirically analyze firms’ decisions on integrating post-production ser-
vices in host countries, to best of my knowledge, no empirical works have estimated
the determinants of firm’s choice between hiring local managers and sending home
service managers.
In the theoretical model, the degree of international mobility indicates a
country’s barrier that hinders the ability of managers from the home country to
provide services in the foreign market. Because the model focuses on managers pro-
25I also compute weighted averages using the five-digit SITC industry level, but do not report
their results due to the reduced number of observations in regressions.
27
viding post-production services to final consumers rather than examining their role
as problem solvers between production workers and top management or technology
transfer to production workers, both of which are related to goods trade inside the
organization (Garicano (2000); Antràs et al. (2008)), I proxy the degree of inter-
national mobility as being a cultural differences between home and host countries
(Rauch (1999); Keller (2002, 2004)).26 I therefore measure the degree of interna-
tional mobility by a common language between countries, represented by a dummy
variable, which is 1 if countries share a common language. Suggested by Rauch
(1999), I construct a common language dummy variable by assigning countries to
language groups on the basis of Ethnologue. However, because the Korean language
is not spoken outside Korea, I assume English to be a common language. Thus, I
construct a dummy variable, language, which is 1 if at least 10% of the population
of the host country speaks English at home.27 Hence, I expect that countries speak-
ing a common language strongly facilitate firms to send home managers, whereas
countries with a different language positively affect firms to employ local managers
to provide services in local markets.
For controls, this paper includes variables representing other firm and coun-
try characteristics. The controls used in the regression are inspired both from the
theoretical model and the broader FDI literature. To capture firm characteristics
that affect the decision to choose an optimal strategy, I add firm-specific assets.
First, I use firm’s R&D intensity, computed as the firm’s total R&D expenditures
divided by total sales at the end of the fiscal year before investing abroad, as a proxy
26These studies have focused on the cultural differences between countries as one of measurements
for knowledge transfers and proposed that country characteristics such as language and religion are
important elements in diffusing international technology that is not necessary related to goods
trade. Although my model is not related to technology diffusions, it is consistent with their work
on studying the role of service managers who are not related to goods trade.
27Data obtained from Ethnologue’s 16th edition and the CIA’s World Factbook shows that, on
average, 18% of Korea’s populace speaks English at home during the sample period.
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for firm-specific assets, some of which can be provided to its foreign affiliates. Multi-
national firms can reduce their production costs by using high technology, which can
be transferred to their plants. Highly R&D intensive firms, therefore, depend more
on their own creation and production technology and are more likely to enter foreign
markets through horizontal FDI.
Second, I add firm’s non-mobile assets that are specific to the host coun-
try as control variables. In particular, I use firm’s international experience, which
is measured by the number of previous foreign affiliates of a multinational firm
worldwide (experience), and the total employment of those firms (size).28 Broad
international experience increases previous knowledge of local markets, connection
to bureaucracy, and business culture which facilitate multinational firms to invest
abroad (Caves (2007); Tekin-koru (2009)). Therefore, this previous knowledge may
influence the firm’s decision not only on production processes, but also on providing
services using different types of managers. I expect positive signs on all of strategies,
even though the strength of this effect on each strategy is ambiguous.
To capture the effects of country characteristics, I measure market size using
the country’s GDP and infrastructure using telephone mainlines per one million
people (telephone). Furthermore, because the theoretical model assumes that the
service managers’ abilities across countries play a key role in affecting the firm’s
decision on providing services in the local market, following the idea from Antràs
et al. (2008) on measuring managers’ abilities, I proxy service managerial ability as
the percentage of agents in the relevant age range enrolled in tertiary education. All
of the country-level data are obtained from the International Financial Statistics of
IMF, the World Development Indicators from The World Bank, and LABORSTA
28Firm size is not only an indicator that captures a firm’s international experience and its capa-
bilities to overcome investment barriers, but also distinguishes the size effect from firm productivity.
29
from International Labour Organization.
Year dummies and industry sector dummies control for year- and industry-
specific fixed effects. Because there exist number of firms that established multiple
facilities during sample period, I also control for these firms in the specification.
Further, I allow for clustering host countries to account for the possible correlated
shocks that might affect all foreign affiliates in the same host country. Table 1.4 in
the Appendix depicts descriptive statistics of the variables used in regression, where




Dependent variables for firm strategies are binary and include firms’ deci-
sions on production location and providing post-production services through dif-
ferent types of managers, which can be interrelated as strategies to serve foreign
markets. For the econometric analysis, therefore, I first divide firms into two sets
based on income-level of their host countries relative to Korea. For each set, I specify
bivariate probit model to test whether the firms’ strategies are related and identify
the determinants of firms’ decisions on locating production and providing services.
The bivariate probit model provides a test for a positive correlation between
firm’s decision to locate production facilities in a host country and to provide services
through local service managers conditional on the vector of covariates including the
explanatory and control variables mentioned in the previous section. Then, I calcu-
late the marginal effects for the joint probability of whether to integrate production
and service in a single location or in multiple locations and whether to provide
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post-production services through local managers are chosen simultaneously.29
In particular, when the bivariate probit is used, firm i’s decisions are:
y∗i,manu = x
′
iβmanu + µmanu (1.25)
y∗i,local = x
′
iβlocal + µlocal (1.26)
where y∗i,j are unobservable and related to the binary dependent variables yi,j by
the following rule
yi,j = 1 if y
∗
i,j > 0 (1.27)
= 0 if y∗i,j ≤ 0 (1.28)
whereas x
′
i is a vector of explanatory variables that account for firm and country
characteristics and βj is a vector of unknown coefficients that are specific to the jth
strategy for j = {manu, local}.
To estimate bivariate probit models, I use a bivariate standard normal dis-
tribution function Φ(.; ρ) by assuming that the mean of error terms (µj) is zero and
variance-covariance matrix V has values of 1 on the leading diagonal and correla-
tions ρ as off-diagonal elements for all j. The correlation coefficient (ρ) denotes the
extent to which the error terms are covary and its sign indicates if firms’ decisions
on integrating production and service in the host country and choosing local service
managers are influenced by unobservable factors whose effects operate in the same
direction. If error terms between the two probit models are not correlated such
that Cov[µmanu, µlocal] = 0, firms’ decisions could be estimated separately through
univariate probit models.
29Because the theoretical model indicates that firm strategies to serve foreign markets involve
producing and providing services of products, the main interest in the empirical analysis is to
examine the economic factors that affect the likelihood of firms choosing joint strategies. In the
appendix, however, I also report the marginal effects for the success probability of each strategy.
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Given the bivariate standard distribution, the joint probability that firm i’s
decisions are simultaneously chosen is defined as:30





if ρ = 0, then the probability of joint strategies is just the product of marginal
probabilities of each strategy.
Furthermore, because the model predicts that firms choosing strategies on
the basis of their productivity level depends on the scale of transport cost and the
degree of international mobility when serving different markets, the interaction ef-
fects of these two determinants play a crucial role in the empirical analysis. Debates
continue, however, on interpreting interaction terms in non-linear models such as
probit models.31 On the other hand, Ai and Norton (2003) and Greene (2010) both
discussed the marginal effects of interaction terms in probit models. These studies
showed that for non-linear models, the total interaction effect may have a different
sign and statistical significance from those determined by a t-test on the estimated
coefficient of the interaction term alone. To present the practical importance of in-
teraction terms, they proposed presenting graphical evidence to supplement probit
regression results, for the purpose of providing further insight into the statistical
and economic significance of the interaction.









where φ(.) is joint probability density function for two standard-normally distributed error terms.
31Arguments exist between whether to interpret interaction terms from estimated probit coeffi-
cients or marginal effects. For example, Frant (1991) and Nagler (1991) argued that interpreting
marginal effects is not straightforward. Because the functional form of a non-linear model implies
that all explanatory variables have non-linear effects on the probability of success, these works have
argued that marginal effects can produce interaction effects based on the distributional assumption,
which results in artificial predictions by calculating the cross-derivative of the expected value of
the dependent variable. On the other hand, Meyer (1995) argued that the marginal effects should
be discussed on interpreting interaction terms because the estimated coefficients only allow the
research to state the significance and the sign of an effect, but not on its extent.
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This paper therefore shows the results of the estimated bivariate probit co-
efficients of interaction terms and calculates average marginal effects of firm produc-
tivity level on the success probability of firms’ joint strategies on choosing production
locations and providing services, conditional on industry and country characteris-
tics. Then, I present figures that provide evidence concerning the statistical and
economic significance of the total interaction effects between firm productivity and
industry and country characteristics.
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1.5.2 Empirical results
Table 1.2: Bivariate probit, high-income countries
Firm strategies
Estimates Marginal effects on joint probability
manu local HL SL
tariff
0.438 0.117 0.058 -0.022
(0.324) (0.364) (0.065) (0.058)
productivity
-0.256 0.546 0.057 0.109
(0.522) (0.585) (0.042) (0.136)
R&D intensity
-0.507 -0.043 -0.053 0.039
(0.394) (0.446) (0.071) (0.081)
experience
0.307∗∗ 0.14 0.491∗ -0.064
(0.141) (0.107) (0.263) (0.126)
firm size
-0.114 -0.095 -0.024 -0.004
(0.102) (0.062) (0.018) (0.004)
language
0.599 0.373 0.095 0.011
(0.962) (1.02) (0.158) (0.135)
GDP
0.013 0.085 0.013 0.012
(0.083) (0.064) (0.011) (0.013)
telephone
-0.133 0.207 0.018 0.045
(0.265) (0.27) (0.036) (0.061)
education
0.008 -0.042 -0.005 -0.007



















LR-test of ρ = 0 χ2(1) = 0.862
Note: Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. ∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance at the 1,5,10 percent,
respectively; regression includes a time, country, firm and industry fixed effects. Testing firms that only
include Korean managers are not available due to the small number of observations.
I begin with the maximum likelihood estimates of the bivariate probit models
using samples from high-income countries, which are reported in Table 1.2. The
table displays coefficient estimates in the first two columns and the average marginal
effects of the explanatory variables on the success probability of joint strategies –
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horizontal FDI with local managers (yi,manu = 1 and yi,local = 1) and service FDI
with local managers (yi,manu = 0 and yi,local = 1) – in the last two columns.
The correlation coefficient (ρ) in Table 1.2 implies that no interrelationship
exists between firms’ decisions related to integrating business activities in the host
country and providing service through local service managers. Examining the deter-
minants for different firm strategies, the coefficient estimates on the tariff rate are
statistically insignificant, as shown in the first and second columns. This indicates
that the transport cost from the home to the destination market, as measured by
the tariff rate, do not effect firms’ decisions to locate production facilities in a host
country and provide services with local managers, independently.
It is interesting to see that productivity is not a significant determinant of
firms’ decisions to locate production abroad. This is inconsistent with prior empir-
ical studies that have emphasized the importance of firm productivity in affecting
firms’ decisions to serve foreign markets such that more productive firms are more
likely to undertake FDI, whereas less productive firms tend to export from the home
country. A possible explanation for this inconsistency is that although service FDI
in this paper involves firm exports, the firm incurs fixed investment costs to en-
ter foreign countries. This suggests that firm productivity does not affect firms’
production location decisions independently between FDI firms. Furthermore, the
model predicts that the effect of productivity on the firm’s choice between integra-
tion strategies is conditional on the transport costs. Insignificant coefficients of firm
productivity, therefore, suggest analyzing its impact on firms’ integration strategies
conditional on the tariff rates.
To gain further insights into the effects of productivity and tariff rate on
firms’ choices, I estimate their interaction effects. The interaction term between
firm productivity and tariff rate in the first column of Table 1.2 is positive yet
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insignificant. As noted, however, one must be cautious in interpreting the interaction
terms from coefficient estimates and marginal effects. In the following analysis,
suggested by Greene (2010), I estimate and present the development of the marginal
effect of firm productivity on the joint probability that firms will choose different
strategies, conditional on different tariff rates.32
Figure 1.1: Interaction effects on the joint probability of firm strategies in high-
income countries
Table 1.5 in the Appendix shows the estimates of the average marginal effect
of productivity on the joint probability of choosing different strategies based on dif-
ferent tariff rate levels. Figure 1.1, in contrast, presents the development of marginal
effects conditional on tariff rates. Examining a firm’s strategy to choose horizontal
32To examine the interaction effects between the level of firm productivity and the degree of
international mobility, I have also computed the marginal effects of firm productivity on the joint
probability of firms’ choosing different strategies, conditional on whether the host country shares a
common language. The results are reported in the last two columns of Table 1.7 in the Appendix.
This table shows that the marginal effects of firm productivity level are widely insignificant for
countries that either share a common language or not.
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FDI with local service managers, Figure 1.1a illustrates that the marginal effect of
firm productivity corresponds to upward direction in tariff rates.33 Basically, this
implies that productivity level becomes more effective in enhancing the probability
that a firm will choose horizontal FDI and employ local managers when tariff rates
are higher. The marginal effect gains statistical significance in the high range of the
tariff rates, implying that the positive effect is realized in countries with a higher
level of tariff rates. The first three columns of Table 1.5 show that the magnitude
gradually increases as the tariff rate increases and holds the statistical significance
at the 5% level in the high range of the tariff rates.
Turning to firm strategy on integrating business activities in multiple lo-
cations, Figure 1.1b shows that the marginal effect of firm productivity follows a
downward direction in tariff rates. This implies that productivity level is more ef-
fective in increasing the probability of a firm engaging in service FDI and employing
local managers when the tariff rate is lower. The last three columns of Table 1.5
indicate that the magnitude of marginal effects decreases as the tariff rate increases.
The statistical significance of the marginal effect holds in the low range of tariff
rates, whereas the effects are widely insignificant in the high range of tariff rates.
Most of the other covariates exhibit their expected signs, although some
exhibit insignificant effects on both of firm strategies to integrate business activities
in a host country and provide services with local managers. In particular, firm’s
experience, measured as the number of previous foreign affiliates of a multinational
firm worldwide, has significant impact on its production location decision. A positive
coefficient estimate in the first column of Table 1.2 indicates that firms with more
market experience have a higher chance of entering high-income countries through
horizontal FDI. Calculating the average marginal effects shows that firms’ experience
33Note: 95% level of confidence interval.
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significantly increases the odds in favor of choosing horizontal FDI with local service
managers.
Turning to other coefficient estimates, it is interesting to discover that the
degree of international mobility, measured as a common language, and manager’s
ability proxied by tertiary education level have no effects on firms’ service strategies.
These results indicate that providing services through different types of managers
is not a firm’s primary concern when serving developed countries.
The results in Table 1.2 suggest that firms’ decisions on integrating business
activities in a host country and providing service through local managers are inde-
pendent as strategies. To gain further insights into the effect of economic factors
on firms’ decisions to serve high-income countries, Table 1.6 in the Appendix dis-
play the results from using univariate probit model. The table reports the probit
estimate coefficients in the first two columns and the average marginal effects of
the explanatory variables on the success probability of each strategy – integrating
production and service in the host country (manu) and providing services through
local managers (local) – in the last two columns.
As expected, the results do not differ significantly from the results of the
bivariate probit shown in Table 1.2. The coefficient estimates of the univariate
probit reveal that the tariff rate and firm productivity level do not have signifi-
cant effects on firms’ production location decisions, whereas firms’ experiences have
significant effects on the probability that they will choose a horizontal FDI strat-
egy to serve high-income countries. I also estimated the interaction effect between
firm productivity and the tariff rate on the likelihood of firms choosing each strat-
egy by calculating the average marginal effects of productivity conditional on tariff
rates. In contrast to the bivariate probit specification, the results showed that the
marginal effects of firm productivity on firms’ decisions of locating production sites
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and providing services were widely insignificant in every range of the tariff rates.
Table 1.3: Bivariate probit, low-income countries
Firm strategies
Estimates Marginal effects on joint probability
manu local HL HH SL SH
tariff
0.156 0.114 0.012 -0.019 0.006 0.0005
(0.119) (0.082) (0.014) (0.012) (0.005) (0.001)
productivity
0.238∗∗∗ -0.006 0.007 0.002 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.052) (0.04) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
R&D intensity
0.545∗∗ −0.088∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.017∗∗∗ −0.02∗ -0.003
(0.273) (0.035) (0.003) (0.006) (0.011) (0.002)
firm size
−0.298∗∗∗ -0.026 −0.015∗∗ 0.002 0.01∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.045) (0.037) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.0008)
language
-0.31 -0.106 -0.069 0.072 -0.068 0.009
(0.208) (0.564) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.009)
education
0.303 -0.07 -0.0001 0.013 -0.011 -0.002
(0.778) (0.309) (0.058) (0.049) (0.029) (0.005)
telephone
0.112∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.0005)
GDP
-0.567 -0.057 -0.029 0.005 0.02 0.004
(0.504) (0.113) (0.024) (0.018) (0.014) (0.003)
experience
-0.002 0.086∗∗ 0.013∗ −0.013∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.0003


















LR-test of ρ = 0 χ2(1) = 8.65
Note: Robust standard errors are in the parenthesis. ∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance at the 1,5,10 percent,
respectively; regression includes a time, country, firm and industry fixed effects.
Table 1.3 reports the results of estimating bivariate probit models using
samples from low-income countries. Consistent with the previous specification, the
table reports bivariate probit estimate coefficients in the first two columns and
the average marginal effects of explanatory variables on the success probability of
joint strategies – horizontal FDI with local managers (yi,manu = 1 and yi,local = 1),
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horizontal FDI with home managers (yi,manu = 1 and yi,local = 0), service FDI with
local managers (yi,manu = 0 and yi,local = 1), and service FDI with home managers
(yi,manu = 0 and yi,local = 0) – in the last four columns.
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In contrast to the previous specification, the correlation coefficient (ρ) is
positive and significant at the 1% level to reject that ρ = 0, indicating that a
complementary relationship exists between firms’ decisions to integrate business
activities in a host country and provide services through local managers when serving
low-income countries. The coefficient estimate of the tariff rate is positive as shown
in the first column of Table 1.3, implying that firms tend to expand production
horizontally in countries that incur high transport costs. Statistically insignificant
estimated coefficients, however, indicate that transport cost has no effect on firms’
choosing different integration strategies to enter low-income countries.35
Firm productivity level has a positive and significant influence on the like-
lihood that firms will integrate production and service in host countries, whereas
it has a negative yet insignificant effect on the likelihood that firms will provide
post-production services with local managers. This result indicates firms that are
relatively more productive are more likely to engage in horizontal FDI, whereas
firms that are less productive tend to engage in service FDI.
34Note that I am testing with the sample of firms that include either type of service managers
in the organization. Observations used in regression account for 95.1% of firms serving low-income
countries via FDI.
35Because the theoretical model predicts that the marginal cost of producing in low-income
countries is smaller than producing and shipping from home, due to the low factor prices, I added
the wage-level of local production workers in each regression where data are obtained from ILO
(Results are excluded for brevity and because of reduced number of observations in regressions).
Specifying firms’ production location decisions, having negative and significant coefficient estimates
on wages and insignificant coefficient on tariff rate suggest that, in general, firms that integrate all
of their business activities in low-income countries are influenced significantly by factor prices such
that firms are likely to integrate production and services in countries with low wages. Alternatively,
the results for specifying firms’ decisions on providing post-production services are similar to ones
reported in the second column of Table 1.3 by showing insignificant coefficients on both tariff rate
and wage level.
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Calculating the average marginal effect shows that an infinitesimal increase
in productivity level significantly reduces the probability of engaging in service FDI
by 0.8% for firms that provide services with local managers and by 0.2% for firms
that send Korean managers to provide service. Although the marginal effects of pro-
ductivity level on firms’ strategy to choose service FDI with either type of manager
is relatively small in terms of absolute magnitude, this is nevertheless economically
meaningful compared to the success probability evaluated at the sample means.
Language, a proxy for the degree of international mobility, is negative yet
statistically insignificant as reported in the second column of Table 1.3. Calculating
the marginal effects of language on the success probability of joint strategies shows
that locating facilities in an English-speaking country reduces the probability of
firms hiring local managers, whereas it increases the probability of sending home
managers through both types of FDI. Statistically insignificant effects, however,
point out that language is not a determinant of a firm’s decision to locate production
in different locations or employ different types of service managers.
To gain further insights regarding the effects of firm productivity level and
the degree of international mobility on firms’ choices in low-income countries, I
estimate their interaction effects. Consistent with the previous specification for
high-income countries, I follow Greene (2010) by estimating the marginal effects of
productivity on the joint probability of choosing different strategies conditional on
whether the host country shares a common language. These results are reported in
the first two columns of Table 1.7 in the Appendix and depicted in Figure 1.2.36
36To examine the interaction effects between firm productivity level and tariff rates, I also esti-
mated the marginal effects of firm productivity on the joint probabilities of firms’ choosing different
strategies based on different tariff rate levels (data not shown but available on request). The results
showed that the marginal effects of firm productivity on joint probabilities were widely insignificant
in all ranges of the tariff rates.
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Figure 1.2: Interaction effects on the joint probability of firm strategies in low-
income countries
Analyzing firm integration strategies that provide services through local
managers, Figures 1.2a and 1.2c show several implications. First, the figure shows
the regression line for firms investing in countries that do not share a common lan-
guage lies above the corresponding line for firms investing in countries that do share
a common language. This is consistent with the results that establishing facilities in
countries that do not share a common language make it more likely that firms will
provide services using local managers. Figure 1.2c, however, indicates that beyond
a certain level of productivity, these firms are likely to provide services through local
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managers in countries that share a common language.
Furthermore, each section of the figure shows regression lines with different
slopes. In particular, the line for firms that invest in countries that do not share
a common language has a positive slope in Figure 1.2a, whereas it has a negative
slope in Figure 1.2c. In other words, these results indicate that productivity level
becomes more important for firms that engage in horizontal FDI with local service
managers, whereas it becomes less important for firms that undertake service FDI
with local service managers in countries that do not share a common language.
Finally, increasing a firm’s productivity level from one standard deviation
below to one standard deviation above the mean from Figure 1.2a increases the joint
estimated probability of engaging in horizontal FDI and including local managers in
countries that do not share a common language by approximately 7%. Similarly, it
reduces the probability of firms engaging in horizontal FDI with local managers in
countries that share a common language by approximately 5%, in which the differ-
ences between the two lines are statistically significant at the 5% level. Alternatively,
decreasing firm productivity level from the mean to one standard deviation below
the mean from Figure 1.2c increases the estimated probability of firms engaging in
service FDI with local managers in countries that do not share a common language
by approximately 0.5%. Similarly, it reduces the probability of firms choosing the
same strategy in countries that share a common language by approximately 1%, in
which the difference between the lines is statistically significant at the 10% level.
Estimations of the average marginal effects of firm productivity on the joint
probability of firms’ choosing different integration strategies conditional on a lan-
guage are reported in first two columns of Table 1.7. I find that in non-English-
speaking countries, firm productivity increases the probability of undertaking hori-
zontal FDI with local managers by 0.4% at the 1% significance level. Alternatively,
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it reduces the probability of firms engaging in service FDI with local managers by
0.5% at the 1% significance level.37
The analysis of choosing different integration strategies for firms that pro-
vide services through Korean service managers is consistent with the results from
the previous specification of firms that employ local service managers. Figures 1.2b
and 1.2d show that firms engaging in both types of FDI are more likely to provide
services through Korean managers when they enter a country that shares a common
language. Furthermore, in countries that share a common language, firm produc-
tivity level becomes important for firms that integrate production and services in
their home locations, whereas it is less important for firms that choose to integrate
in multiple locations.
Increasing firm productivity level from one standard deviation below to one
standard deviation above the mean in English-speaking countries (Fig. 1.2b) sig-
nificantly increases the firms’ propensity to provide services with home managers
through horizontal FDI; indeed, it is higher than the increased probability of firms
undertaking horizontal FDI in non- English-speaking countries. Although decreasing
firm productivity level from one standard deviation above to one standard devia-
tion below the mean in non-English- and in English-speaking countries (Fig. 1.2d)
increases the probability of firms to engage in service FDI by sending home service
managers, the difference between the two increases are statistically insignificant.
Computing for the average marginal effects of firm productivity on the joint
estimated probability of firms’ choosing different strategies (HH,SH), conditional
on whether the host country shares a common language, the second column of
37Conditional marginal effects of firm productivity are computed at the mean levels of other
firm and country characteristics. For more details on computing conditional marginal effects of
interaction terms, see Christofides et al. (1997) and Norton et al. (2004).
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Table 1.7 shows that firm productivity increases the probability of firms choosing
horizontal FDI with home service managers by 0.6% at the 10% significance level in
English-speaking countries. Alternatively, firm productivity level reduces the odds
in favor of firms undertaking service FDI with home managers by 0.5% at the 1%
significance level.
Turning to other coefficient estimates in Table 1.3, firm size has a significant
impact on firms’ integration strategies, whereas firms’ experience has a significant
effect on firms’ post-production service strategies. In particular, larger size increases
the probability of firms choosing service FDI with either type of service managers,
whereas firms with more international experience are more likely to provide services
with local managers through both types of FDI in low-income countries. On the
other hand, firms’ R&D intensity and the host country’s infrastructure have sig-
nificant effects on both firms’ production and service strategies. Calculating their
average marginal effects show that firms have a high propensity to undertake hori-
zontal FDI with either type of service managers if they are highly R&D intensive or
in countries with a rich infrastructure. Consistent with previous specifications for
firms serving high-income countries, managerial ability measured as tertiary educa-
tion level of the host country has no effect on firms’ strategies to provide services
with different types of managers in low-income countries.
Table 1.8 in the Appendix reports the univariate probit estimates of firm
and country characteristics on firms’ decisions to choose locations for the production
process and different types of managers to provide services. The results do not differ
significantly from the results of the bivariate probit shown in Table 1.3. For example,
the coefficient estimates on the univariate probit reveal that the firm productivity
level and its size have significant effects on firms’ production location decision, such
that firms with higher productivity levels and smaller size are more likely to choose
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horizontal FDI in a host country. Alternatively, firm experience has positive and
significant impacts on the strategy to provide services through local managers.
Computing the average marginal effects of firm productivity on the probabil-
ity of firms choosing each strategy, conditional on a language, the results showed no
interaction effects between these factors. The marginal effects of productivity level
on each strategy were widely insignificant for countries that either share a common
language or not. In contrast to the results from Table 1.3, however, the coefficient
estimate on the tariff rate shows that it has a positive and significant impact on
the probability of firms choosing horizontal FDI, in the absence of their decision to
provide services through different types of managers.
Overall, the empirical results from testing firms in low-income countries
suggest that firms’ decisions on locating production facilities in a host country and
providing services through local managers are complementary. Supplementing the
graphical analysis with the bivariate probit regression provides evidence that firm
productivity level has a significant effect on the joint probability of choosing different
strategies when interacted with a language. In particular, in countries that share a
common language, firms that are more productive are more likely to undertake hori-
zontal FDI with home service managers, whereas firms that are less productive tend
to engage in service FDI with home service managers. Alternatively, in countries
that do not share a common language, horizontal FDI with local service managers
is more likely to be chosen by firms that are more efficient. Service FDI with local
service managers, on the other hand, tends to be performed by firms that are less
efficient. All of these results support the predictions from the theoretical model.
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1.6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, I examine integration strategies of Korean firms that involve
producing final outputs and providing post-production services to serve foreign mar-
kets. In the theoretical model, consumers in all countries perceive the service qual-
ity of products based on the inner value of service and the ability of managers
that demonstrate the products’ service value. On the other hand, heterogeneous
firms must provide services for products through their subsidiaries abroad, but can
produce output in either their home or host country.
The model shows that the equilibrium decision of a firm depends on its
productivity and other economic factors that affect decisions on integrating business
activities and providing services. By adding service quality differences into the
heterogeneous firms trade model, I introduce that a new pattern of FDI – service
FDI – appears as one of the available strategies firms can use to serve global markets.
To my knowledge, this has not been studied before.
Using Korea’s middle-income status, I examine two scenarios separately; that
is, when firms choose optimal strategies to serve high- and low-income countries.
Then, I estimate a model of firms’ strategies using a rich set of plant- and parent
firm-level data of Korean multinational firms from 2002 through 2009. The empirical
results indicate that firms’ optimal strategies are affected not only by its productivity
level, but also by different factors for each scenario. In particular, the results show
that firms entering high-income countries are concerned primarily with the transport
cost, a crucial element for firms’ integration strategies. Alternatively, firms serving
low-income countries are affected mostly by the degree to which service managers
are internationally mobile between countries, which plays an important role in firms’
post-production service strategies.
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The main goal of this paper was to study firm’s optimal integration strate-
gies to serve foreign markets by incorporating decisions on providing services after
production. As such, a range of questions including other options in the firms’ de-
cision are not addressed in this paper. I have not considered various possibilities to
serve foreign markets that are important for a full account of firm strategies, such as
outsourcing providing service to foreign firms through contracting or cross-border
mergers and acquisitions, or possibility of investing in physical product quality.
Furthermore, given this paper’s focus on studying firm activities to serve foreign
markets with different sizes, the analysis was also limited to comparing firm inte-
gration strategies to serve between high-income and low-income countries relative
to the home country.
In the present study, one of primary interests is to examine the effect of ser-
vice managers in providing post-production services. The basic premise of the model,
therefore, is that the preference for the service quality of products by a consumer in
all countries is affected by the managers’ abilities. Put differently, this assumption
implies that consumer’s preference is homothetic with respect to per capita income.
Indeed, previous trade literature have analyzed the non-homotheticity of demand
for physical product quality and found that the relative demand for high-quality
products is higher in high-income countries. For future research, therefore, it would
be interesting to study how the non-homotheticity of demand for service quality
affects firms’ strategies to serve global markets. This would involve extending the
model. Furthermore, including both service and product qualities in consumers’
preferences would yield various implications on multinational firm activities when
serving global markets. These questions are left for future research.
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1.7 Chapter Appendix
In this appendix, I will discuss firms’ optimal strategies to serve different for-
eign markets when they can also produce varieties in third countries. For simplicity,
I assume that there exist a third country with different market size where firms can
only use it as an export-platform.38 Here, I will study the effects of third production
location on firms’ optimal strategies to serve high-income and low-income countries,
respectively. For expositional simplicity, I assume that transport costs and fixed
investment costs of setting up plants are symmetric across countries.
For firms that serve high-income countries, they can produce varieties in the
South and ship them to the service facilities located in the North. This integration
strategy would impose transport costs and fixed investment costs of setting up plants
in multiple locations, but conserve the production cost. In this case, the profits from
























































η−1 − FC,n (1.35)
38To make it consistent with the main theme of the paper, I assume that a third country is not a
target market for multinational firms. Allowing a third country to be firms’ another target market
is consistent with Aw and Lee (2008) who develop three-country model consisting of low-income,
middle-income and high-income countries to study how firms in a middle-income country make
production location decisions to serve global markets.
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where equations (1.30) to (1.33) represent firm profits made from engaging in hori-
zontal FDI and service FDI with including different types of service managers, which
are consistent with profit functions in Section 1.3.1.1. On the other hand, equations
(1.34) and (1.35) represent firm profits made from undertaking complex FDI with
home and local service managers, respectively. Complex FDI indicates firm’s inte-
gration strategy to produce varieties in the South by investing in production facility
and ship products to service facility in the North to provide post-production services
in the local market.
Under the assumption on managerial abilities across countries, it can also
be seen that between firms that choose complex FDI strategy, the profit made from
providing services through local managers dominates the profit made from sending
home managers to the North. Therefore, among three possible integration strategies




n ), which integration strategy to choose depends
not only on firm productivity level but also on the transport costs.
Figure 1.6 shows the profits attainable for firms with different levels of pro-
ductivity, θ: in case of high transport cost (t > wn/ws) in Figure 1.6a and low
transport cost (t ∈ (1, wn/ws)) in Figure 1.6b. Both figures depict profit functions
reflected underlying equations (1.31), (1.33), and (1.35). The steeper ΠCLn relative
to ΠSLn from both figures reflect lower marginal cost of production involved for firms
that produce in the South than produce in the home country. This implies that
more productive firms are affordable to pay higher fixed costs and take advantage
of higher returns generated by the lower production cost in the South.
However, Figure 1.6a shows that due to the high transport cost, the profit
from engaging in horizontal FDI dominates the profit from undertaking complex
FDI for firms in the all range of productivity levels. Consistent with the results
from prior section, more productive firms will integrate business activities in the
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North, whereas less productive firms undertake service FDI, and all firms will pro-
vide services by employing local service managers. It is never profitable to integrate
business activities in different locations. Alternatively, if transport costs are rela-
tively low, Figure 1.6b shows that firms are never profitable to engage in horizontal
FDI, which is also consistent with the results from the prior section. More produc-
tive firms are now in the position to overcome the highest fixed costs and produce
a large volume of varieties with the lowest unit cost of production in the South and
ship to the North, whereas less productive firms undertake service FDI.
To summarize, when firms have an option to establish production facilities
in the South and use them as an export-platform to the North, they would only
choose this alternative integration strategy when transport cost is low. In this
case, the model shows that more productive firms will bear high fixed costs of
establishing facilities in multiple locations and produce varieties with low marginal
cost. However, if the transport cost is relatively high, firms will find that it is never
profitable to choose an alternative option.
Now, suppose that firms have an option to produce varieties in the North
and ship to their service facilities in the South to serve local markets. With same
fixed investment costs for establishing production and service facilities in foreign
countries, producing in the South always incurs lower marginal cost than producing
in the North and ship to the South. Therefore, between firms that choose the same
type of service managers, it is never profitable to undertake complex FDI strategy.
Instead, consistent with the results from Section 1.3.1.2, more productive firms will
integrate business activities in the South, whereas less productive firms will produce
and export products from the home country.
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Figure 1.3: Relationship between country’s per capita income and education level
in 2009
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Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics of new FDI-firms in 2009
Variable Mean SD
productivity 0.182 0.788
R&D intensity 0.254 0.29
Firm size 3857.63 11726.87
Firm experience 1.89 3.16
High-income countries
Tariff rates 1.67 0.704
Language 0.523 0.328
Managerial ability 0.728 0.147
GDP 7.665 5.905
Low-income countries
Tariff rates 5.56 1.82
Language 0.684 0.565
Managerial ability 0.251 0.118
GDP 2.571 1.413
Note: GDP is in US billion dollars.
Table 1.5: Marginal effect of firm productivity level on firm integration strategies
and the level of tariff rates, high-income countries
HL SL
tariff rate marginal effects of 95% Confidence tariff rate marginal effects 95% Confidence































Note: Standard errors using delta method are in the parenthesis. ∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗,∗ denote significance at the
1,5,10 percent, respectively.
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Table 1.6: Univariate probit, high-income countries
Firm strategies
Estimates Marginal effects
manu local manu local
tariff
0.427 0.122 0.171 0.042
(0.333) (0.368) (0.133) (0.129)
productivity
-0.255 0.536 -0.101 0.187
(0.521) (0.576) (0.208) (0.198)
R&D intensity
-0.507 -0.044 -0.202 -0.015
(0.393) (0.444) (0.156) (0.155)
experience
0.306∗∗ 0.142 0.122∗∗ 0.497
(0.142) (0.104) (0.056) (0.362)
firm size
-0.114 -0.094 -0.045 -0.032
(0.101) (0.063) (0.04) (0.022)
language
0.585 0.381 0.228 0.127
(0.976) (1.04) (0.365) (0.324)
education
0.007 -0.042 0.003 -0.014
(0.014) (0.03) (0.005) (0.01)
GDP
0.012 0.084 0.004 0.029
(0.082) (0.062) (0.033) (0.021)
telephone
-0.134 0.207 -0.053 0.072














pseudo R2 0.1531 0.1267
Log L 165.45 -150.21
success probability 0.502 0.811
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 1,5,10 percent,
respectively; all regressions include a constant, time, country, firm and industry fixed effects. Testing firms
that only include Korean managers are not available due to small number of observations.
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Table 1.7: Conditional marginal effects of firm productivity level
Conditional marginal effects
Low-income countries High-income countries
language = 0 language = 1 language = 0 language = 1
∂HL
∂productivity
0.004∗∗∗ 0.064 0.027 0.073







−0.0054∗∗∗ -0.065 0.104 0.106






Note: Conditional marginal effects of firm productivity are computed at the mean levels of firm and
country characteristics. Estimation of marginal effects on joint probabilities of firms’ choosing different
integration strategies with Korean service managers when serving high-income countries are excluded due
to small number of observations.
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Table 1.8: Univariate probit, low-income countries
Firm strategies
Estimates Marginal effects
manu local manu local
tariff
0.151∗∗∗ 0.114 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.051) (0.082) (0.003) (0.014)
productivity
0.28∗∗∗ -0.005 0.019∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.084) (0.04) (0.004) (0.007)
R&D intensity
0.643∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗
(0.207) (0.035) (0.014) (0.006)
firm size
−0.303∗∗∗ -0.027 −0.021∗∗∗ -0.004
(0.045) (0.037) (0.002) (0.006)
experience
0.036 0.084∗∗ 0.002 0.014∗∗
(0.03) (0.038) (0.002) (0.006)
language
-0.443 -0.113 -0.045 -0.021
(0.645) (0.563) (0.088) (0.113)
education
-0.045 -0.065 -0.003 -0.011
(0.359) (0.313) (0.025) (0.055)
GDP
-0.043 -0.059 -0.003 -0.01
(0.15) (0.114) (0.01) (0.02)
telephone
0.152∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗














pseudo R2 0.1720 0.072
Log L -238.35 -298.28
success probability 0.968 0.897
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 1,5,10 percent,
respectively; all regressions include a constant, time, country, firm and industry fixed effects.
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Figure 1.4: Profits from different integration strategies serving high-income countries
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Figure 1.5: Profits from different integration strategies serving low-income countries
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Regional Economic Integration and Multinational Firm
Strategies in Middle-Income Countries
2.1 Introduction
Regional economic integration impacts the structure of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) flows of multinational firms inside and outside the region. By taking
advantage of low trade barriers such as common external tariff on goods shipped
within the region, firms are likely to establish facilities in the host country and use
them as an export platform. For example, using U.S. affiliates data, Ekholm et al.
(2007) showed that 40% of total sales made by affiliates located in member countries
of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) account for the export sales to
U.S. compared to 12% of total sales that account for export sales to the U.S. from
other countries, whereas Feinberg and Keane (2006) also found the same evidence
by showing that 19% of U.S. affiliates in Canada only engage in export sales to the
U.S.
This paper examines the effect of regional economic integration on patterns
of foreign direct investment of firms based in Korea. Due to the limited data, prior
works studying the effect of regional economic integration on multinational firm
activity have been restricted to maintain focus on FDI flows of firms in developed
countries like the U.S. or Japan. Using Korea’s middle-income status, our empirical
analysis focuses on the factors that affect the decision of firms in middle-income
countries to choose a production location inside the different trade integrated re-
gions, a region with high-income countries (European Economic Area), and a region
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with low-income countries (ASEAN Free Trade Area) and studies the patterns of
FDI in each region. Therefore, we attempt to show that, when entering trade inte-
grated region, firms make decisions depending on the aggregate size of the region and
present a theoretical model to explain the factors that affect different firm activities
in these regions.
Previously, relatively few papers have studied the relationship between free
trade agreements and firms’ FDI activities. These works focus on the export-
platform FDI made by firms outside the region as a response to regional trade
agreements (Chen (2009); Antràs and Foley (2009)). For example, Antràs and Fo-
ley (2009) develop the Helpman et al. (2004) model with three countries consisting
of large and two symmetric small countries to show that the formation of free trade
agreement between small countries (ASEAN) leads an increase in the number of
firms locating plants inside the region and their share of export sales to third coun-
tries. However, rather than analyzing firm activities in response to the formation of
a free trade agreement between countries, we focus on the factors that affect firms’
different FDI strategies inside different trade integrated regions.
In our related work that studies the decision of firms in middle-income coun-
tries, Aw and Lee (2008) examine how firm productivity affects the production lo-
cation decision of Taiwanese multinationals. Their paper is the first to consider the
location decision of firms from middle-income country to serve two different income-
level countries, the U.S. and China. Using the firm-level data of Taiwanese multi-
nationals; they find that the most productive firms serve both countries through
local subsidiaries followed by a firm investing in a rich country (U.S.), whereas the
less productive firm serves a poor country (China), and the least productive firm
exports.
In this paper, however, rather than focusing on horizontal FDI investments
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in different income-level countries, we modify the Aw and Lee’s framework by con-
sidering two free trade areas that are different in terms of income-level of member
countries and analyze two scenarios in which a firm makes production location de-
cisions to serve a free trade area with high-income countries and a region consisting
of low-income countries.
We first study the case in which a firm makes a decision on locating a
production site in each of free trade areas, assuming that the member countries are
symmetric. From this case, we argue that the firms’ production location choices
vary depending on their productivity level such that more productive firms invest in
free trade areas by locating plants in multi-locations to serve local markets followed
by firms entering the region through locating plants in a single location not only to
engage in local sales but also export sales (complex FDI). In particular, we show
that the main feature of the free trade area, which is low trade barriers within the
region, plays am important role in less productive firms’ decision to enter and engage
in complex FDI.
Then, our model presents that the firms’ complex FDI differ depending on
the aggregate size of trade integrated regions such that firms engaging in complex
FDI inside high-income regions involve serving local market and third countries
through exports, whereas complex FDI inside low-income region include serving
local market and exports to not only third countries but also to the parent country.
Given that the firm’s pattern of FDI inside the trade integrated region are
likely to differ based on its aggregate size, using the firm- and plant-level data of
Korean firms, we estimate the model separately for firms investing in EEA and
firms investing in AFTA between 2002 and 2008. For each region, we specify a
probit model to identify the determinants of firms’ investment patterns and find the
results that are consistent with our theoretical prediction.
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This paper makes two main contributions to the trade literature. First, we
extend Aw and Lee (2008) by developing a three-country model that accounts for
interdependence between the host country, where production takes place, and the
final consumption countries within trade-integrated region. By introducing trade-
integrated regions into Aw and Lee’s framework, we allow firms with different pro-
ductivity levels to choose different patterns of FDI based on the regional character-
istics. In contrast to Aw and Lee (2008), we introduce the strategy of engaging in
multiple types of FDI in a single location.
Second, apart from prior empirical studies, which focus on analyzing in-
vestment patterns of firms from North to South countries, we introduce firms in
a middle-income country that can invest in the North as well as in the South. In
particular, developing a one-stage production model, we focus on analyzing produc-
tion location choices and activities of firms from Korea inside EEA and AFTA. This
model enables us to use unique information in a plant-level data set on the desti-
nation of outward FDI among Korean multinational firms. By analyzing Korean
firms, our goal is to gain insights into different FDI strategies that firms can choose
if they seek to enter developed or developing trade integrated region.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents recent FDI activities
among Korean firms worldwide and analyzes their investment patterns inside and
outside the trade integrated regions. Section 2.3 develops a theoretical model for
firms’ production location choices in different regions. Section 2.4 describes the
plant- and firm-level data used for the empirical estimation, and the estimation
results are presented in Section 2.5. Section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 Data Facts
Table 2.1: Distribution of sales by Korean affiliates (percent) in 2002 and 2008
Year Location 2002 2008
Share of sales to local market
EEA 0.499 0.456
Non-EEA countries 0.767 0.935
AFTA 0.292 0.351
Non-AFTA countries 0.855 0.728
Share of sales to Korea
EEA 0.026 0.023
Non-EEA countries 0.107 0.04
AFTA 0.069 0.108
Non-AFTA countries 0.032 0.073
Share of sales to third countries
EEA 0.474 0.521
Non-EEA countries 0.126 0.024
AFTA 0.639 0.542
Non-AFTA Countries 0.113 0.199
Number of firms
EEA 59 220
Non-EEA countries 10 12
AFTA 69 634
Non-AFTA countries 27 63
Table 2.1 provides information on the direction of sales of Korean affiliates
inside trade-integrated regions (EEA and AFTA) and other regions in 2002 and
2008.1 The sample includes 81% of all Korean multinational firms in the manufac-
turing industry. Affiliates’ sales are broken down into local sales in the host country,
export sales to the parent country (Korea), and export sales to third countries.
The last row of Table 2.1 demonstrates that the majority of firms locate
plants inside trade-integrated regions and that their numbers have dramatically
increased in relation to firms investing in other regions. Examining their direction
of sales, it is apparent that firms locating plants inside trade integrated regions
1In the table, EEA consists of 19 member countries, whereas AFTA includes 9 member countries
(Brunei not included). On the other hand, 4 non-EEA European countries account for other
European Countries, whereas 11 non-AFTA Asian countries account for Other Asian Countries in
Table 2.1. Note that other countries include countries that do not have any free trade agreement
relationship with Korea.
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tend to have complex patterns of FDI, which indicates that firms engage in multiple
types of FDI, whereas firms investing in other regions are more likely to exhibit pure
horizontal FDI strategy.
In both trade integrated regions, the table shows that most firms exhibit
undertaking complex FDI while having a large share of export sales to third coun-
tries. However, it can be seen that firms investing in EEA tend to have a larger
share of local sales, whereas firms investing in AFTA tend to have a larger share of
export sales to the parent country. This evidence indicates the importance of low
trade barriers within the free trade area that promote outsider firms’ export sales
to third countries and that firms tend to exhibit horizontal motives for FDI in large
markets, while they are likely to have vertical motives for FDI in a region with low
factor costs. These stylized facts are consistent with our theoretical model which
introduces a complex FDI strategies for firms in different regions.
2.3 Model
In this section, we develop a simple partial equilibrium model to analyze
the effects of different regional economic integrations on the decision of firms in
middle-income country to locate their plants and serve markets within each in-
tegrated region. The main purpose of the paper is to study how each regional
economic integration among high-income countries and among low-income coun-
tries affects the location choice of firms in a middle-income country and their FDI
strategies inside the free trade area. Therefore, we build a three-country model by
developing the approach of Aw and Lee (2008) and Antràs and Foley (2009) and
consider two scenarios to analyze the effect of regional trade integration between
high-income countries (EEA, which will be called North) and between low-income
countries (AFTA, which will be called South) on the location decision of firms.
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, 0 < α < 1
where Ω represents the continuous set of all available varieties and q(i) is a consump-
tion of variety i by the representative consumer. If we maximize utility function






where ε = 1/1−α > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between heterogeneous goods,
E is the exogenous expenditure level of the country, and P is the ideal price index
of the country, with p(i) being the price of variety i.2 If we define Aj = Ej/P
1−ε
j to
be aggregate demand level of country j, the demand for variety i in country j can




On the production side, there is a continuum of firms in Home which are
indexed by their heterogeneous productivity level ϕi.
3 These firms only use la-
bor to produce final good i. The unit variable cost of production for a firm with










3In this paper, we only consider one-stage production by firms. See Grossman et al. (2004)
for more details on firm’s “complex” FDI strategies when intermediate goods are added in firm’s
production.
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where wj is wage level of workers in country j. Each country differs in its factor
prices such that we assume the wage level of workers to be the largest in the North,
followed by Home, and the South has the lowest: wN > wH > wS .
4
When a firm enters the industry in country j via FDI, we assume that it
incurs fixed investment cost fj in every foreign market. On the other hand, when a
firm exports products to country j from Home, these goods are subjected to melting-
iceberg transport cost tj > 1, whereas goods shipped from foreign affiliates to other
countries within the trade-integrated region are subjected to common transport cost
τ such that τ ∈ (1, tj). After entry, these firms engage in monopolistic competition.
Taking a demand function as given, the price that maximizes the firm’s profit




where 1/α markup factor.
Therefore, the profit of a firm that serves the local market through its local
subsidiary in country j will be as follows:







where Bj = (1 − α)Ajαε−1 and Θi = ϕε−1i . For expositional simplicity, we define
BH = B such that BN = βNB and BS = βSB, where βN > 1 > βS , which implies
that aggregate demand level is the largest in the North, whereas it is the smallest
in the South relative to Home.
4Following Aw and Lee (2008), we have calculated average hourly wage in EEA, Korea, and
ASEAN using the data from LABORSTA. We found that average earnings per hour for manufac-
turing during sample period was $27.64 in EEA, $13.66 in Korea and $3.89 in ASEAN countries.
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On the other hand, if a firm engages in exporting to serve foreign market j,
the profit of a firm that produces in home country (h) will be thus:






whereas the profit of a firm exporting to j from its local subsidiary located in country
(k) within trade integrated region will be as follows:






2.3.1 Firms serving a developed trade integrated region (EEA)
In this subsection, our goal is to study the effects of regional economic inte-
gration between high-income countries on the location decision of firms in a middle-
income country. Here, we consider three countries consisting of two identical North-
ern countries and Home (N,N,H).
When firms produce goods in Home and export to North, it will cost them
tN > 1. For firms that locate production facilities in North, it will cost them fixed
investment cost fN , whereas shipping products within trade integrated region has
relatively low transport cost τN ∈ (1, tN ). For a simple notation, we assume that
West and East are symmetric countries inside the Northern region.
Goods selling in each market can be produced from any of three countries.
To serve global markets, therefore, this implies that there are 27 possible location
combinations that the firm can choose. Here, we denote (x, y, z) as choices set
that firms can choose to locate their plants to service Home, West, and East. For
example, HWW indicates that firms serve Home domestically while they establish
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which implies that the variable cost of exports to the destination market is higher
from the home country than from a country within the free trade area. Under




H + βN (wHtN )

























All four location combinations indicate that Home is served domestically,
whereas serving countries inside the Northern free trade area is different. In partic-
ular, location choice (HHH)N represents that both Northern countries are served by
exports from Home, whereas (HWH)N = (HHE)N represents that one of North-
ern countries is served by exports from Home and the other is served by the local
subsidiary. Location choice (HWW )N = (HEE)N denotes that both Northern
countries are served by the local subsidiary in a single location; i.e. the firm locates
a plant in one of Northern countries to serve its local market and also export to the
third country. (HWE)N denotes that both Northern countries are served by local
subsidiaries in each country; i.e. the firm locates plants in several locations to serve
their local market only. We can depict the above four locations in a figure thus:
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Figure 2.1: Profit functions in case of Home, North, and North
Figure 2.1 shows that the most productive firm serves countries within the
Northern free trade area through horizontal FDI in multiple locations, whereas
the relatively less productive firm serves the region via complex FDI in a sin-
gle location – engaging in not only local sales but also export sales to the third
country within the region. Alternatively, the least productive firm serves the re-
gion through exports from Home. It is interesting to see that location choice
(HWH)N = (HHE)N is dominated by (HWW )N = (HEE)N from the figure.
This indicates that firms with an intermediate productivity level (firms with pro-
ductivity level between Θ(HHH,HWW ) and Θ(HWW,HWE) in the figure) are
never profitable to serve the free trade area through pure horizontal FDI strategy.
Instead, low transport cost within the region (τ) encourages these firms to enter
and undertake complex FDI strategies. From the data we can see that these loca-
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tion combinations and FDI strategies reflect the recent Korean multinational firm
activities inside EEA.
2.3.2 Firms serving a developing trade integrated region (AFTA)
In this subsection, our goal is to study the effects of regional economic inte-
gration between low-income countries on the location decision of firms in a middle-
income country. Here, we consider three countries consisting of two identical South-
ern countries and Home (S, S,H).
Consistent with the first case in which firms invest in the Northern free
trade area, when firms produce goods in Home and export to South, it costs them
tS > 1. For firms that locate plants in South, they incur the fixed investment cost
fS , whereas shipping products within the free trade area has the low transport cost
τS ∈ (1, tS). For a simple notation, we assume that West and East are symmetric
member countries inside the Southern free trade area in this subsection. Because
firms can produce goods in any of the three countries, we still have 27 possible
location combinations that firms can choose to serve global markets.5 Here, we




which implies that relative variable costs of Home to South is greater than the
transport cost from Home. This assumption indicates that South has the low factor
cost, such that affiliates producing goods in South and exporting back to Home incur
lower variable cost than producing domestically. Under assumption (2.2), there now
5Consistent with previous subsection, (x, y, z) represent choices set that firms can choose to
locate their plants to serve Home, West, and East inside the Southern free trade area.
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In contrast to the location combinations that firms can choose when they
invest in the Northern free trade area, firms now have a vertical motive for FDI
by taking advantage of the low factor costs to produce goods in South and ship
back to Home. Except for the case in which firms produce domestically, the last
four location combinations indicate that Home is now served by the local subsidiary
located in South.
In particular, when serving the Southern region, location choice (WHH)S
represents that, while Home is served by exports from South, countries inside the
free trade area will be served by exports from Home. (WWH)S presents that one of
Southern countries is served by a local subsidiary while the other country is served
by exports from Home. (WWW )S denotes the choice that the firm locates a plant
in a single location inside the region to undertake a complex FDI strategy which
involves serving the local market and third country via exports. (WWE)S indicates
that the firm invests in both Southern countries only to engage in local sales.
Figure 2.2 indicates that the most productive firm invests in the Southern
free trade area to engage in horizontal FDI in one country and complex FDI in the
other, whereas the relatively less productive firm invests in the region by engaging
in complex FDI that involves not only serving the local market but also Home and
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Figure 2.2: Profit functions in case of Home, South, and South
third countries through exports. On the other hand, the least productive firm serves
the region through exports from Home. In contrast to Figure 2.1, we can see that
firms now locate plants inside the region to engage in export sales to Home due to
the low variable costs. For firms that locate plants in multiple locations, therefore,
one of the plants will be designed to undertake a complex FDI, whereas the other
will be established to engage in a pure horizontal FDI. Alternatively, firms that
locate plants in a single location will export not only to Home but also to third
countries.
Consistent with the first case, Figure 2.2 shows that firms with an interme-
diate productivity level (firms with productivity level between Θ(HHH,WWW )
and Θ(WWW,WWE) from the figure) will not be profitable in locating a plant in
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a single location inside the region to serve its local market only or also export to
Home (it is apparent that the location choice (WWW )S dominates (WWH)S and
(WHH)S). Instead, low transport cost within the region encourages these firms to
engage in complex FDI that involves not only local sales but also export sales to
Home and third countries. These findings also reflect recent Korean multinational
firm activities inside AFTA, shown in Table 2.1.
To summarize, we find that, when firms enter the free trade area, regardless
of its aggregate size, more productive firms engage in FDI while less productive firms
export, which is consistent with the recent FDI literature studying firms’ modes of
foreign market access (Helpman et al. (2004); Aw and Lee (2008)). In particular,
we show that, among FDI firms, more productive firms engage in horizontal FDI
by investing in multiple locations inside the region followed by firms engaging in
complex FDI by investing in a single location. However, firms’ complex FDI strategy
differs depending on the size of the region such that firms investing in North are likely
to engage in local sales and export sales to third country, whereas firms investing
in South tend to focus on export sales to the home country in addition to the third
country to conserve production costs.
Our model resembles those of Aw and Lee (2008) by studying FDI strategy
of firms in middle-income countries for serving geographically separate markets.
Our findings, however, provide an alternative view on firms’ FDI strategies such
that when entering the trade integrated region, firms are never profitable to use
their facilities in the host country only to serve local market. Instead, low transport
costs within the region affect firms, specifically relatively less productive firms to
undertake complex FDI strategies, which include export sales. In the following




In the previous section, we developed a three-country model to study the
effects of the different free trade areas on firms’ location choices and FDI strate-
gies. Here, we discussed that the regional economic integration affects firms with
a relatively low productivity level to enter the region by engaging in complex FDI,
whereby firms locate plants in a single location to engage in not only local sales
but also export sales. Moreover, firms’ complex FDI strategies differ depending on
the income level of countries such that export sales made by affiliates in low-income
regions are not only from third countries, but also from the parent country.
To test our predictions from the model, this paper requires plant-level and
firm-level data. Here, we use data from the Korean foreign direct investment ob-
tained from the Overseas Direct Investment Statistics from the Export-Import Bank
of Korea. This plant-level data include the full list of Korean worldwide investment
from 2002 to 2008, for which 2002 is the first year that the Export-Import Bank of
Korea officially started to collect data. All foreign affiliates abroad, of which Korean
firms hold at least a 10% ownership, are included in the sample, and each foreign
affiliate is disaggregated by industry sectors and by its destination countries in a
given year.
This plant-level data are very useful in that they provide information on
individual foreign affiliates in the host country. In particular, they not only have
information on affiliates’ balance sheets but also provide total sales disaggregated
by (i) sales made from the local market, (ii) sales made from exporting back to the
home country, and (iii) sales made from exporting to third countries. In particular,
since data enable us to break them down within each of these categories into sales
to other foreign affiliates of Korean firms or foreign joint ventures and sales to
unaffiliated customers, it is very useful to distinguish plants by whether they engage
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in horizontal, vertical, or complex FDI by their sales.
The other source of firm-level data for the analysis is provided by the Fi-
nancial Supervisory Service of Korea and the Korea Information System database
of the Korea Investor’s Service Co., Ltd.. This data contain information on firms’
balance sheets, profits and loss statements, export status, output (value-added), and
the employment divided by production and non-production sectors of all firms that
are registered as corporations. These firms are classified by the Korean Standard
Industrial Classification (KSIC) set by the Korea National Statistical Office that is
closely related to commonly used Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). For the
empirical analysis, this paper merges firm-level data from KIS with the plant-level
data from the Export-Import Bank of Korea.
2.4.1 Data Analysis
In order to test our predictions on complex FDI strategies of entry firms with
an intermediate productivity level, we first divide firms by three-digit KSIC level
from each period.6 From each manufacturing sector, we select firms that establish
local subsidiaries worldwide between 2002 and 2008. Since our firm-level data do not
provide information on specific destination countries to which firms export and our
main goal is to study firms that engage in complex FDI, we test with samples that
include firms investing in foreign countries during the sample period. To estimate
firm characteristics, which is among the study’s main interests, we follow Aw and
Lee (2008) on measuring firm labor productivity as the mean levels of revenue plus
net inventory change divided by mean levels of total employment.7
6Note that since our model assumes that labor is the only input to produce goods, we only
consider firms in manufacturing industry for the analysis.
7Since our data do not provide information on the capital flow or stock, we were not able to
proxy total factor productivity as a measure of firm productivity.
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For regional characteristics, because we are particularly interested in firm
activities inside two different free trade areas, EEA and AFTA, we measure EEA
as a binary variable, which is equal to 1 if a firm locates a plant inside EEA, and
AFTA, which is equal to 1 if a firm builds a plant inside AFTA countries. Therefore,
our main interest is to study how interaction terms between firm productivity and
free trade area dummy variables affect firms in their choice between different FDI
strategies.
Our econometric analysis includes control variables that represent other firm
and host country characteristics. First, we include firm size, which is measured by
the total employment of the firm, and R&D intensity, computed as the firm’s total
R&D expenditure divided by total sales. To estimate country characteristics, we add
trade cost, which is measured as a ratio of CIF imports to FOB imports, regarding
which data are obtained from IMF Direction of Statistics, and country’s income-
level, which is measured by GDP per capita, for which data are obtained from the
World Development Indicators 2009.
2.5 Empirical Results
The specifications presented in Table 2.2 report the results by estimating
the effects of free trade area and its interaction term with firm productivity level
on the direction of sales of new Korean affiliates. The sample includes observa-
tions from all European regions for the results in first three columns, whereas it
includes observations from all Asian regions in last three columns.8 Each regres-
sion includes year-fixed effects and industry-fixed effects to control for the possible
8To save space, we do not present the results of running pooled OLS regression with observations
from worldwide. In particular, we obtain the results that are approximately same estimate and
statistical significance of each coefficient from Table 2.2. Results are available upon request.
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time trends and for any unobserved systematic differences across industry sectors.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that allow for clustering of host coun-
tries are computed to explain the possible correlated shocks that might affect all






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The dependent variables in the first and last three columns are the direction
of sales of new Korean affiliates – share of sales to the host country, to Korea, and
to third countries, respectively. Here, we are particularly interested in finding out
whether a single plant inside the free trade area established by the less productive
firm exhibits a high share of local and export sales. In this specification, the coef-
ficients on the EEA dummy variable estimate whether new Korean affiliates have
distinctive sale patterns inside EEA as opposed to affiliates in other European re-
gions, whereas the AFTA dummy variable estimates the difference in sales patterns
for affiliates inside AFTA as opposed to other affiliates outside the region.
The coefficient on the EEA dummy in the first column is negative and sig-
nificant at the 10% level, implying that new Korean affiliates inside EEA do not
tend to have large shares of local sales as opposed to other affiliates in Europe. The
insignificant coefficient in the second column indicates that new affiliates inside EEA
do not exhibit distinctive export sales to the home country, whereas the positive and
significant coefficient in the third column indicates that the new Korean affiliates
inside EEA are more likely to engage in export sales to third countries than other
affiliates in Europe. Alternatively, coefficient estimates on firm productivity in the
first three columns indicate that more productive firms have a large share of export
sales to third countries, whereas firm productivity does not tend to influence their
affiliates’ sales to local market or home country through exports.
The interaction term between firm productivity level and EEA dummy vari-
able in the first column is positive and significant at the 1% level, which indicates
that the more productive firms inside EEA tend to have a large share of local sales.
The negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term in the third column
implies that firms with low productivity level inside EEA region are likely to have a
large share of export sales to third countries within the same region. On the other
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hand, the results present that there is no significant interaction effects between the
firm productivity level and the EEA region on firms’ motives to engage in export
sales to the parent country.
The negative and significant coefficients on AFTA dummy variables in the
fourth and fifth columns imply that firms do not have a large share of local sales,
as neither do export sales to the parent country by locating plants inside AFTA
as opposed to firms investing in other Asian region. Alternatively, the positive and
significant coefficient on AFTA in the last column indicates that firms are more likely
to have a large share of export sales to third countries inside AFTA as opposed to
other firms. The coefficients on interaction terms between firm productivity level
and AFTA in last three columns have expected signs but show that they have
statistically insignificant effects on firms’ direction of sales.
For other control variables, coefficients on trade cost show that it has a
significant influence on firms’ export sales back to Korea from the Asian region
such that firms have a large share of export sales from Asian countries that incur
low trade cost. Meanwhile, trade costs do not have significant effect on firms’
sales in local markets, an insight that does not support the proximity-concentration
hypothesis studied in traditional trade literature (Brainard (1997); Helpman et al.
(2004)), which argues that firms tend to expand production horizontally across
borders as trade cost increases. Alternatively, coefficients on the countries’ GDP
per capita provide evidence that firms’ motives to serve the local market through
FDI is positively associated with the income-level of the destination country. It is
also interesting to see that, in both regions, firms’ size has a negative influence on its
sales in the local market and Korea via exports, whereas size has a positive impact
on firms’ export sales to third countries.
For the robustness check, we have retested previous results by adding other
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control variables. Because our model predicts that less productive firms enter free
trade areas by locating plants in a single location to engage in local and export sales
and that more productive firms invest in multiple locations to serve their local mar-
kets, we include other dummy variables representing the number of foreign affiliates
that a firm locates in each free trade area. In particular, the Multi-EEA dummy is
equal to 1 if a firm locates more than two affiliates inside EEA countries, whereas
Multi-AFTA is equal to 1 if a firm locates more than two affiliates inside AFTA
countries in a given year. Consistent with the previous specification, dependent
variables represent the pattern of sales for new Korean affiliates.
In this specification, the coefficients on the Multi-EEA dummy variable esti-
mate whether new Korean affiliates in multiple locations inside EEA have distinctive
sales patterns, whereas coefficients on the Multi-AFTA dummy variable estimate the
same effect inside AFTA as opposed to other firms investing in non free-trade areas.
Therefore, we are interested in finding out whether firms investing inside free trade
areas exhibit distinctive local and export sales from a single location when we also
consider firms that establish plants in multiple locations inside the same region.
Table 2.4 in the Appendix presents the results with the addition of new
variables. Note that we also add new interaction terms productivity*Multi-EEA and
productivity*Multi-AFTA in each region to study how each firm’s decision to serve
different markets depends on its productivity level and establishing plants in mul-
tiple locations inside free trade areas. The estimate and significance of coefficients
are approximately the same as those from the previous results. In particular, the
coefficients of Multi-EEA and Multi-AFTA are all insignificant in Table 2.4 to es-
timate firms’ decision to engage in local or export sales, implying that establishing
plants in multiple locations inside either free trade area do not exhibit distinctive
local or export sales as opposed to affiliates outside the region. However, the pos-
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itive and significant coefficient of interaction term between firm productivity level
and Multi-EEA in the first column provides evidence that, among firms that locate
plants in multiple locations inside EEA, more productive firms are more likely to
have a large share of local sales in its location, which is consistent with our model.
The results from Table 2.2 and 2.4 provide evidence that support the hy-
pothesis that free trade areas are attractive for firms to locate plants and undertake
export sales to third countries than serve its local market, or export back to the
home country (AFTA). Among firms that enter EEA, we find that less productive
firms are more likely to engage in export sales to third countries by investing in a
single location, whereas more productive firms have a large share of local sales by
investing in multiple locations. However, our results do not show that firm produc-
tivity and its interaction with locating plants in AFTA have significant association
with firms’ decision to serve different markets in Asia. In particular, we cannot find
evidence regarding how the free trade area and productivity level of entering firms
affect their decisions to engage in multiple types of FDI simultaneously. Because
firms engaging in complex FDI may have different shares of sales made from serving
different markets, we should consider using other methodology to examine firms’
choice of different FDI strategies and its determinants.
Here, we use a probit model to examine firms’ choice of complex FDI strate-
gies:
E[y | x, z] = Prob(y = 1 | x, z)
= Φ(βx+ δz)
= Φ(A)
where Φ(A) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and x and z
denote the set of explanatory variables representing firm and country characteristics,
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respectively. Our dependent variable (y) is a binary variable which is equal to 1 if
a firm engages in specific FDI strategy through the establishing plant in a single
location. In particular, Complex is a binary variable equal to 1 if firms’ affiliate
makes sales from the local market and exports to third countries from a single
location. Therefore, it indicates firms’ complex FDI strategy that involves serving
local market and third countries through exports. Complexx is a binary variable
equal to 1 if firms’ affiliate makes sales from local market and export to home
and third countries, implying firms’ complex FDI strategy that involves not only
engaging in local sales but also exporting sales to home and third countries. Finally,
Purehori is a binary variable equal to 1 if firms’ affiliates make sales only from the
local market, and represent the firms’ pure horizontal FDI strategy that does not
include any of the export sales.
In this specification, we are particularly interested in finding out whether a
single plant inside the free trade area established by less productive firms exhibit
complex FDI strategy. Consistent with the previous analysis, therefore, the main
coefficient of interest is coefficients on the free trade area dummy variables – EEA
and AFTA – and their interaction term with firm productivity level. Here, we also
add control variables that represent firm and country characteristics and include
year and industry-fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that
allow for clustering host countries are computed to explain the possible correlated
shocks that might affect all affiliates in the same host country.
Table 2.3 reports the results from estimating the effects of free trade areas
on firms’ different FDI strategies by using a probit model. The first three columns
present the results from testing firms that enter the European region, whereas the
last three columns show the results of firms investing in the Asian region. Within
each region, we present the coefficient estimates of the probit model. We also report
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Table 2.3: FDI Strategies of new Korean affiliates








−0.199∗ -0.011 0.053∗∗∗ -0.052 -0.025 0.039∗∗








0.033 -0.302 -0.452 0.309 0.29∗ −0.481∗
(0.619) (0.217) (0.3) (0.51) (0.162) (0.28)
Firm size
0.127∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.07 0.001 0.001∗∗∗ 0.071
(0.046) (0.036) (0.046) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.048)
Trade cost
0.01 -0.045 0.078∗ -0.046 -0.132 0.6∗
(0.039) (0.03) (0.046) (0.063) (0.172) (0.361)
GDP per capita
0.002 -0.012 0.019∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.0004 0.019∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.042) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006)
Observations 159 159 159 404 688 686
Number of countries 14 21
R-squared 0.1561 0.1067 0.053 0.089 0.0594 0.0558
Log-Likelihood -90.49 -148.65 -450.13 -112.73 -170.97 -448.96
Wald chi2 (Prob > chi2)
659.95 91940.67 168.34 165.66 2656.3 182.04




−0.044∗ -0.003 0.021∗∗∗ -0.011 −0.005∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.024) (0.006) (0.007) (0.021) (0.003) (0.006)
Note : Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error allowing for clustering by host country are in
parentheses. * represents significance at 10% level, ** for significance at 5% level, *** for significance at
1% level.
the marginal effects of each variable at sample means on the predicted probability of
firms to choose different FDI strategies in Table 2.5 in the Appendix. Furthermore,
because our main goal is to study interaction effects between firm productivity level
and the trade integrated region on the probability of firms choosing different FDI
strategies, we estimate these probability effects by computing marginal effects of firm
productivity level on the probability of a firm engaging in a specific FDI strategy,
conditional on firms that invest in the free trade area, evaluated at the mean values
of other explanatory variables.
We first examine the effects of free trade area on firms’ decision to engage
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in complex FDI strategies in the European region. In the first column, the probit
coefficient estimates suggest that less productive firms tend to engage in complex
FDI, whereas EEA do not have significant influence on firms’ strategy in the Euro-
pean region. However, the probit coefficient of interaction term, productivity*EEA,
is negative and significant at the 10% level, suggesting that less productive firms are
more likely to undertake complex FDI inside EEA. The results are the same when
we compute the marginal effects at sample means. Firms with low productivity
levels tend to engage in complex FDI, but it cannot be supported that EEA attract
firms to undertake complex FDI in their region.
Computing the marginal effects of firm productivity level on the probability
of choosing FDI strategy, conditional on firms’ investment in EEA, we find that,
inside EEA, an infinitesimal increase in firm productivity reduces the probability
that these firms undertake complex FDI by 4.4%, which is significant at the 10%
level. Alternatively, outside EEA, an infinitesimal increase in firm productivity
increases firms’ probability to engage in complex FDI by 2%, but it is statistically
insignificant. For firms that invest in Asia, probit estimates of all variables are
insignificant in the fourth column, implying that firm productivity and AFTA are
not determinants of firms’ decisions to engage in complex FDI strategies.
Next, we examine the effects of free trade area on firms’ decisions to en-
gage in complex FDI strategies that involve export sales to home country in Asian
region, which is our main of interest in testing the prediction of firm activities in
developing countries. In the fifth column, the probit coefficient estimates indicate
that firms investing in AFTA are more likely to engage in complex FDI as opposed
to firms entering non-AFTA. However, the results indicate that firm productivity
does not affect firms’ complex FDI strategies independently. On the other hand,
the insignificant probit coefficient of interaction term between firm productivity and
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AFTA does not support our prediction of the model that less productive firms tend
to choose complex FDI strategy inside AFTA.
The results do not change much when we compute marginal effects at sample
means such that firms that invest inside AFTA are likely to engage in complex
FDI. Alternatively, computing the marginal effects of firm productivity levels on
the estimated probability of firms to choose complex FDI, conditional on whether
firms invest in AFTA, shows that, inside AFTA, an infinitesimal increase in firm
productivity reduces the probability that these firms undertake complex FDI by
0.5%. Outside the AFTA, the entry of less productive firms increases the probability
of firms engaging in complex FDI by 0.2%, but it is statistically insignificant.
For estimating interaction effects in non-linear models, since the marginal
effect of interaction term depends on the levels of the explanatory variables consist-
ing of the interaction term, the coefficient of the interaction term may not correctly
reflect the statistical significance and the direction of the marginal effect, with re-
spect to the interaction terms. Ai and Norton (2003) and Greene (2010) show that
the total interaction effect can have a different sign and statistical significance from
those determined by a t-test on the estimated coefficient of the interaction term
alone. To better understand how the marginal effect of firm productivity level to its
probability of choosing FDI strategy interacts with the free trade area, a graphical
demonstration would supplement probit regression results to provide further insight
with respect to the statistical and economic significance of the interaction.
Following Greene (2010), Figure 2.3 plots the relation between firm produc-
tivity level, free trade area, and the probability of firms’ choosing complex FDI, and
their interaction from the model in columns 1 and 5 from Table 2.5. To assess the
economic significance of firm productivity level on firm’s complex FDI strategy, the
vertical lines in Figure 2.3 show how the estimated probability of firms’ engagement
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Figure 2.3: Complex strategies of firms investing inside trade integrated regions
in complex FDI outcome varies as firm productivity level moves from one standard
deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean.
Figure 2.3 illustrates three important features of the results for the model
in columns 1 and 5 from Table 2.5. First, in both regions, the regression line for
firms investing inside free trade area lies above the corresponding line for firms
investing outside the region, which is consistent with the results that investing in a
single location inside free trade area makes firms more likely to engage in complex
FDI (However, it can be seen that firms with the highest productivity level tend
to prefer outside the AFTA to engage in complex FDI). Second, in the European
region, regression lines for firms that invest inside and outside the EEA have a
negative slope where the line for firms investing inside EEA is steeper, which is
consistent with the positive sign on the interaction term between firm productivity
level and EEA in the first column of Table 2.5. Alternatively, in the Asian region,
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the regression line for firms investing inside and outside the AFTA have a different
slopes, which is consistent with the negative sign on the interaction term in the
fifth column. This indicates that higher productivity level assigns less importance
to engaging in complex FDI for firms inside AFTA.
Third, decreasing firm productivity level from one standard deviation above
to one standard deviation below the mean in Figure 2.3a increases the estimated
probability of engaging in complex FDI for firms inside EEA by approximately
2.5%, whereas it increases the estimated probability of complex FDI by approx-
imately 0.5% for firms that invest outside the EEA. These increases of estimated
probabilities are economically significant, as is the difference between firms investing
inside and outside EEA, both of which support the overall economic significance of
the interaction term, productivity ∗EEA. In the Asian region, decreasing firm pro-
ductivity level from one standard deviation above to one standard deviation below
the mean increases the estimated probability of engaging in complex FDI for firms
inside AFTA by approximately 3%, whereas it decreases the estimated probability
for firms outside AFTA by approximately 1%. Consistent with the results from the
European region, these increases and decreases are economically significant, as is the
difference between firms investing inside and outside AFTA, which also supports the
overall economic significance of the interaction term, productivity ∗AFTA.
For other types of FDI strategies in the European region, the probit coef-
ficient estimates suggest that EEA is not a determinant of firms’ choice on either
pure horizontal FDI or complex FDI that involves export sales to home. The third
column of Table 2.3 implies that more productive firms are more likely to engage in
pure horizontal FDI in Europe, whereas firm productivity has no significant effect
in interaction with EEA.9 However, computing the marginal effects of firm pro-
9Our graphical analysis on the result of interaction term from column 3 also shows that there is
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ductivity level on the estimated probability of engaging in different types of FDI,
conditional on firms that locate plants inside EEA, show that an increase of firm
productivity level raises the estimated probability of engaging in pure horizontal
FDI by 2.1%, which is significant at the 1% level.
In the Asian region, the probit coefficient estimates in column 6 indicate
that AFTA and firm productivity independently affect firms’ decision to choose pure
horizontal FDI such that productive firms or firms entering non-AFTA countries are
more likely to serve the local market via horizontal FDI. Alternatively, the results
show that firms’ decision to choose complex FDI that does not include export sales
to the home country is not affected by its productivity or AFTA. The interaction
term between the firm productivity level and AFTA is positive and significant in
the last column, implying that firms investing inside AFTA tend to engage in pure
horizontal FDI.
In our graphical analysis, we find that interaction terms between firm pro-
ductivity level and AFTA do not have significant effects on the probability of engag-
ing in complex or pure horizontal FDI for both firms inside and outside the AFTA.
Furthermore, computing marginal effects of firm productivity level on the estimated
probability of engaging in different types of FDI, conditional on firms that locate
plants inside AFTA, shows that an increase of firm productivity level decreases
the probability of engaging in complex FDI that does not include export sales to
the home country by 1.1%, yet statistically insignificant, whereas it significantly
increases the probability of engaging in horizontal FDI by 1.5%.
no interaction effect between firm productivity and EEA. The figure is available upon the request.
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2.6 Summary and Conclusion
Regional economic integration affects outsider firms’ production location de-
cisions and FDI strategies on serving the global market. In our paper, we have
presented a model where firms based in a middle-income country decide on the
optimal production locations for serving geographically separate trade integrated
regions. The model shows that the equilibrium decision of a firm depends on its
own productivity level and other regional characteristics.
In particular, we found that regional economic integration affects relatively
less productive firms to enter and undertake complex FDI. Depending on the aggre-
gate size of the region, firms’ complex FDI strategy is different such that undertaking
complex FDI inside a developed region involves local sales and export sales to third
countries, whereas it includes local sales and export sales to not only third country
but also the home country inside developing regions. Exploiting the firm- and plant-
level data of Korean firms, we specified a probit model to link firms’ FDI strategies
with their productivity levels and trade integrated region. Our empirical results are
consistent with the theoretical predictions.
However, one may question why some firms enter the region with high-
income countries, whereas others invest in the region with low-income countries.
Since our analysis was limited such that firms have information on their destinations
prior to the investment, for future research, it will be interesting to discuss the
factor that might affect firms’ production location choices when they can choose
to invest in either a developed or developing region. For instance, assuming that
production requires skilled and unskilled workers and study how the skill-intensity
of the production affects firms’ decision will be a good start. These questions are
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.5: FDI strategies of entry firms, average marginal effects at sample means








−0.022∗ -0.001 0.021∗∗∗ -0.007 −0.003∗ 0.016∗∗∗








0.004 −0.032∗ −0.18∗ 0.043 0.036∗ −0.192∗
(0.071) (0.023) (0.119) (0.073) (0.021) (0.111)
Firm size
0.014∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.028∗ 0.0001 0.01∗∗∗ 0.028∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.018) (0.0001) (0.005) (0.019)
Trade cost
0.001 −0.005∗ 0.031∗ -0.006 0.017 0.227∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.018) (0.009) (0.023) (0.126)
GDP per capita
0.0001 0.001 0.008∗∗∗ 0.0002 -0.0001 0.008∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.03)
predicted probability 0.057 0.052 0.504 0.074 0.065 0.505
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Chapter 3
Technology Spillover Through Worker’s Mobility and
Exporters’ Choice
3.1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, multinational firms have come to play an increas-
ingly important role in international trade, accounting for two-thirds of world trade
by the year 2000. Whereas in the past, firms used to export goods to destination
countries, their pattern of international economic activity has now changed. By tak-
ing advantage of proximity to consumers, firms today invest directly in their own
local subsidiaries to produce goods and increase local market share.
Meanwhile, many host countries attract more multinational firms to engage
in foreign direct investment (FDI) by providing generous investment or tax incen-
tives. While their expected benefits include financial development and creation of
new jobs, one of the reasons for attracting FDI is the possibility of acquiring new
technology, which may spill over from multinational firms to the host country and
allow domestic firms to improve their performance in the market.
It has long been thought that multinational firms have access to some type
of firm-specific asset, and then change it to production technology or a marketing
technique, which can subsequently be transferred to their foreign affiliates (Mans-
field and Romeo (1980)). By attracting various multinational firms to build plants
in countries, host governments expect that some of this firm-specific asset will be
transferred to domestic firms, thus allowing them to improve worker productivity
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or skills. This potential mechanism may be important for developing countries to
catch up with industrialized nations, and is one piece of evidence indicating that
FDI might benefit a host economy.
There has been a substantial body of work investigating different forms of
technology spillovers from multinational firms in their host countries. First, there
are both backward and forward linkages between foreign affiliates and domestic
firms (Rodriguez-Clare (1996); Smarzynska Javorcik (2004)). These studies show
that when multinational firms source intermediate inputs in a low-wage country and
if the demand for inputs is high enough, then multinational firms create higher net
backward linkages that push undeveloped domestic firms (or suppliers) out of the
bad equilibrium and thus gain relatively more. In other words, positive “vertical”
spillovers occur from multinational firms to their domestic suppliers. This outcome
might also be related to what is called competition effect, whereby domestic firms face
competition with other suppliers from local to foreign, and have to be more efficient
– improving their own performance to survive in the intermediate goods market.
Second, there are demonstration effects, in which domestic firms learn by imitating
from technological innovations introduced by multinational firms, that result in an
increase of productivity (Mansfield and Romeo (1980)). Third, spillovers, which
have been studied recently, arise through labor movements where foreign affiliates
train local workers who will later join domestic firms, bringing along some or all
of the multinationals’ firm-specific knowledge, such as technological and managerial
(Fosfuri et al. (2001); Markusen and Trofimenko (2009); Poole (2008)).
In this paper, I am particularly interested in the last form of technology
spillovers, specifically the theoretical study by Fosfuri et al. (2001), which presents
a two-stage duopoly model between multinational and domestic firms to study the
conditions under which technology spillovers occur in the host country. They built
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a model in which multinational and domestic firms compete for the services of local
workers who have been previously trained by multinational firms. In their work,
technology spillovers arise when monopoly profit made by multinational firms if
they use the technology by themselves is less than the aggregate profit made by
multinational and domestic firms if they both use the technology.1
Other empirical studies have focused on examining the effect of workers’
movement on the performance of domestic firms. Using detailed firm-level data
of Ghanaian manufacturing firms, Gorg and Strobl (2005) find that domestic firms
whose owners once worked in multinational firms in the same industry are more pro-
ductive than similar domestic firms. Exploiting a sample of Chinese manufacturing
firms, Hale and Long (2006) also established evidence of productivity spillovers
from multinational firms by showing a positive and significant correlation between
the percentage of managers who once worked in multinational firms and a firm’s
total factor productivity.
In summary, considering technology spillovers through workers’ mobility be-
tween multinational and domestic firms, the aforementioned studies present the
findings that once trained workers are hired by domestic firms, they make a contri-
bution to the company by raising its productivity level and as a result, FDI might
benefit the development of the host economy.
This paper starts, however, by asking the question: What if trained workers
are not hired by domestic firms but instead are hired to other foreign affiliates, so
that technology spillovers occur between multinational firms in the host country?2
1In their model, a multinational firm has a firm-specific technology which can be used it as a
monopolist in the foreign market. Only after local firm appropriates technology by hiring trained
worker, it can enter the market and create duopoly structure.
2In fact, other studies investigate whether all domestic firms acquire technology spillovers from
multinational firms, by arguing that infrastructure must be built up by firms to implement foreign
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Because the empirical results of the aforementioned literature validate the idea that
domestic firms benefit from technology spillovers by an increase in productivity
level from hiring trained workers, it is reasonable to think that some technology- or
productivity-laggard firms may try to benefit from spillovers by entering the host
market through FDI.
Examining the factors to explain different patterns of firm entry into foreign
markets, traditional trade studies have focused on the trade costs. This is known as
the proximity-concentration trade-off which explains why firms invest abroad when
the profits from avoiding trade costs outweigh the costs of supporting additional
capacity in foreign markets (Brainard (1997)). Recent studies have sought to incor-
porate heterogeneous firms into the proximity-concentration trade-off. Specifically,
Helpman et al. (2004) build a simple multi-country and multi-sector model that
stresses the important role of within-sector firm productivity differences in explain-
ing the structure of international trade and investment. Exploiting U.S. exports and
affiliate sales data, they find that the more productive firms engage in foreign activ-
ities – and that of those firms servicing foreign markets, only the most productive
ones engage in FDI while the less productive ones service through exports.
Apart from aforementioned trade literature on firm’s choice of entry through
FDI or exports, this paper explores the incentive of exporters to choose between
exports and FDI when servicing foreign markets. Excluding domestic firms from the
model, my main goal in this research is to study the conditions under which such
exporters switch to FDI when servicing foreign markets. To answer the question, this
technologies. More specifically, these studies set out to test the hypothesis that the incidence of
externalities is dependent on a domestic firm’s absorptive capacity and find out the relationship
between technology spillovers and absorptive capacity (e.g., Girma and Wakelin (2001)). These
studies show that technology spillovers are present when technology gaps are moderate, and that
firms in developing countries lack the necessary absorptive capacity to integrate new information
into the production process.
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paper focuses specifically on whether the existence of technology spillovers in a host
country can be a determinant factor for exporters to switch their strategies to FDI.
To the best of my knowledge, this work is the first approach to consider technology
spillovers through labor mobility between multinational firms through their local
subsidiaries in the host country, and substantiates the position that technology
spillover through workers’ mobility in a host country does not always benefit the
host economy.
To investigate whether the existence of technology spillovers affects the deci-
sions of exporters to service foreign markets via FDI, this paper builds a two-period
duopoly model along the lines of Fosfuri et al. (2001). In the model, FDI firms
and exporting firms compete for the service of local workers who have been trained
by FDI firms in the host country. Assuming that hiring previously trained workers
would result in an increase of profit by the recipient firm, exporting firms will switch
to FDI only if they hire trained workers. Alternatively, to protect intangible asset,
FDI firms will manage to keep trained workers by offering higher wages or may
choose to export rather than invest in host countries in the first place.
By introducing a simple parametric model, this paper finds that technology
spillover arise dependent on firm- and country-specific characteristics. First, this
paper shows that spillovers are likely to occur when the products are rather imperfect
substitutes. In other words, exporting firm has a higher chance of hiring previously
trained workers when product market competition is relatively weak. Second, I
find that spillovers are likely to occur as firms have similarity in the technological
capabilities. Third, spillovers may occur in host countries where costs of training
local workers are low, such as in countries with higher educational level of local
workers. However, this paper finds that transport costs have ambiguous effect on
the occurrence of technology spillovers and thus, to exporters’ decision.
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This paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 sets up a simple duopoly model
and derives comparative statics on how economic variables affect the occurrence
of technology spillover and discuss the obtained results. Section 3.3 concludes the
paper.
3.2 Model
For simplicity, this paper adopts a parametric model introduced by Singh
and Vives (1984). The utility function of a foreign representative consumer across
differentiated varieties has the following form:






where xi denotes the consumption of variety produced by firm i (i = {f, e}) and the
parameter a indicates an asymmetry between the two varieties. The parameter g is
a measure of substitutability between goods, where 1/g2 is a measure of the degree
of product differentiation.3 Maximizing the utility function subject to standard
budget constraint generates the following inverse demand:
pf = 1− xf − gxe
pe = a− xe − gxf
Each differentiated variety is produced by separate firms at the constant
marginal cost (c). In the home country, there are two firms that serve foreign
markets through FDI or exports. If a firm chooses to export from the home country,
it has to bear the unit export cost denoted by τ (τ ∈ (0, 1)). On the other hand, if
3Two varieties are symmetric if a = 1. If a > 1, firm e has a cost advantage with respect to
firm f , whereas it has a cost disadvantage if a < 1. On the other hand, the varieties can be defined
as complements, independent, or substitutes if g < 0, g = 0, or g > 0 respectively. For example,
varieties are perfect substitutes when g = 1. In this paper, for simplicity, I assume that g > 0.
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a firm chooses to serve the market by establishing a local subsidiary, it can conserve
on the export cost but will have to incur a one-time fixed cost of employing FDI (F ),
which includes all costs associated with forming a business activity in the foreign
country.
Prior to the production, I assume that a firm f is endowed with new tech-
nology which can be used to serve foreign markets through FDI.4 The only possible
channel to transfer technology to its local subsidiaries is by training a local worker
in the host country (on-the-job-training). At period t = 0, a firm f can decide to
serve the foreign market through FDI with the new technology or exports. If a firm
chooses to engage in FDI, it builds a foreign affiliate in the host country by bearing
fixed costs F . Firm then hires the local worker and train her by sending a staff
of supervisors from the headquarters, which incurs the cost of training the worker
T . This worker is hired from a pool of identical untrained worker and is paid the
reservation wage w which is normalized to zero. When hiring, I assume that a firm
makes one-period contract. Since new technology is relevant only for the FDI, this
knowledge will not be transferred in the host country if a firm decides to export from
the home country. On the other hand, a firm e does not possess new technology
and it will serve the foreign market through exports.
After training, the local worker acquires all the knowledge and information
of firm’s specific assets. At the first period, production takes place and the profit of
4In the model, new technology can be thought of as payoff relevant information, such as new
managerial technique. Here, I assume that this technology is exogenously given and cannot be
transferred between firms in the home country.
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firm f if it undertakes FDI will be:5
ΠIf,1 =
[
2(1− c)− g(a− τc)
4− g2
]2
On the other hand, firm e will make use of production facilities and export
from the home country. The profit will be:6
ΠEXe,1 =
[
2(a− τc)− g(1− c)
4− g2
]2
In the second period, informed worker’s contract is expired. Perceiving the
status of informed worker, firm e realizes that it could appropriate the technology
by switching to FDI and hires her. From the findings of previous empirical studies
on spillovers by workers’ movement, I assume that if trained worker is hired by
a firm, then the recipient firm increases its profit by θ.7 Therefore, a firm e will
switch to FDI only if it can hire a trained worker from firm f , whereas firm f would
like to retain its trained worker within the company to avoid the dissipation of its
knowledge-based asset.
If firm e decides to enter the foreign market by switching to FDI in the
second period, it will compete for the previously trained worker against firm f .
Drawing from Fosfuri et al. (2001), I assume that each firm simultaneously and
independently makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to trained worker. The firm with
5As mentioned earlier, firm f may choose to export in the first period. In this case, the profit





. For simplicity, however, I assume that the profit from engaging
in FDI always dominates the profit from exports within the period, such that ΠIf,t > Π
EX
f,t for
t = {1, 2}.
6Note that I denote by Πki,t the profit earned by firm i = {f, e} in period t = {1, 2} where
k = {I, EX} (I stands for FDI and EX for exports).
7Gorg and Strobl (2005) and Hale and Long (2006) provide an evidence of increased profit
through an increase in firm’s productivity after the informed manager is hired by domestic firms.
Since this technology is limited to FDI activities, firm will not hire informed local manager and
take her back to the headquarters for exports.
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the highest willingness to pay for trained worker hires her by paying exactly the
maximum willingness to pay of the competitor. The willingness to pay for trained
worker by each firm depends on the outside options. Here, I assume that if firm f
loses a trained worker, it has to call back the staff from its headquarters to instruct
other local workers, which incurs additional training costs T . On the other hand, if
firm e does not hire trained worker in the second period, it does not have any other
possibility for acquiring technology. Consequently, it does not have an incentive, an
increase in profit, to switch to FDI. To find the equilibrium solutions, I first identify
the outcome of the hiring process in the second period.
Firm f ’s maximum willingness to pay for trained worker is:





which implies the difference between the profit it would earn if it kept trained worker
(I(r)) and the profit it would earn if it lost trained worker to the competitor (I(l)).8
On the other hand, the maximum offer of firm e is given by:
V maxe = Π
I
e,2 −ΠEXe,2
which is the difference between the profit it would earn from doing FDI if it hires
the trained worker and the profit it would earn from exports if it does not hire her.
Hence, firm e will switch from exports to FDI only if V maxe > V
max
f , or
when technology spillovers occur. In this case, firm e will set up a local subsidiary
in the host country by bearing the fixed costs of doing FDI, and start the business
by employing a trained worker. Conversely, firm f will have to hire new untrained
8Note that since firm f would never prefer to export even if it loses the trained worker to firm e
(due to the assumption that the profit from FDI dominates the profit from exports in the second
period), its maximum willingness to pay will be the difference of profit from FDI when it retains
the worker and when it loses her.
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employees, a process that will incur additional training costs. For simple notation,
I assume that foreign market size is constant during periods and discount factor is
















However, if V maxf > V
max
e , then there will be no technology spillovers and
firm f will retain informed worker, whereas firm e remains in exports. In this case,










2(a− τc)− (1− c)g
4− g2
]2
Solving the model by backward induction, there are two possible equilibrium
situations in this game. First, technology spillovers will arise under conditions:
4c(τ − 1)(2a− c(1 + τ)− (1− c)g
(4− g2)2
> T + F (3.1)
4c(τ − 1)(2− c(1 + τ)− g(a− τc)
(4− g2)2
> T (3.2)
Condition (3.1) implies the result of the hiring process in which firm e has a
higher maximum willingness to pay for the trained worker and hires her. Condition
(3.2) indicates that firm f still prefers to engage in FDI rather than exports in the
first period even if it expects to lose trained worker to the competitor.
Second, technology spillovers will not occur under conditions:
4c(τ − 1)(2a− c(1 + τ)− (1− c)g)
(4− g2)2
≤ T + F (3.3)




Condition (3.3) implies that firm f retains a trained worker by offering higher
maximum willingness to pay for her and condition (3.4) indicates that firm f prefers
to engaging in FDI to exporting when it anticipates that it would retain the trained
worker by paying the wage V maxe .
9
To simplify the presentation, I fix the values of all parameters but a and g
and analyze the solution in the plane (a, g). Figure 3.1 illustrates the equilibrium
outcomes for the benchmark case.10 Curves (1), (2) and (3) define the equilibrium
outcomes and corresponds to the conditions (3.1), (3.2) and (3.4).
Figure 3.1: Equilibrium Outcomes
From Figure 3.1, it can be pointed out that under holding other parameters
constant, firm e can anticipate the occurrence of technology spillovers when the
products are rather imperfect substitutes (high values of g). In other words, firm e
9The sufficient condition for the technology spillovers to occur is that firm f must engage in FDI
and train local workers in the first period. Hence, if condition (3.2) or (3.4) does not hold, there
will be no technology spillovers in the game.
10For simplicity, parameters are fixed as F = 1/8, T = 1/16, c = 1/2, τ = 0.4, and θ = 2.
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is more likely to hire the trained worker and switch to FDI when product market
competition is weak. Alternatively, technology spillovers are likely to arise in the
host country when firms have similar technological levels or when they are more
symmetric. When a is very large, firm f expects that technology spillovers will arise
in the second period if it engages in FDI and will choose to export in the first period
to protect its intangible asset. On the other hand, when a is very small, firm e’s
maximum willingness to pay for trained worker decreases and technology spillovers
do not occur.
3.2.1 Comparative Statics
In this subsection, I proceed to comparative statics based on the benchmark
case illustrated in Figure 3.1. The goal is to have more insights into the effects of
economic variables on the occurrence of technology spillovers in the host country.
Figure 3.2: The effect of an increase in training cost (T )
Figure 3.2 shows the effect of an increase in training costs T (T rises from
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1/16 to 1/8). When training costs increase the FDI firm (f) offers more for the
trained worker because it is more costly to bring a new staff of supervisors from the
headquarters when it loses the trained worker. Furthermore, an increase in training
costs makes an export more favorable option to serve the foreign market than FDI.
These effects shift curves (1) and (2) and make spillovers less likely to occur. Hence,
exporters have more incentive to switch to FDI in countries with low training costs,
such as countries that have a higher level of education in workforce.11
Figure 3.3: The effect of an increase in fixed cost of FDI (F )
Figure 3.3 illustrates the changes when fixed cost of FDI increase (F rises
from 1/8 to 1/4). When the cost of FDI, such as the cost of forming a local sub-
sidiary, increases, exporters (firm e) find it more costly to switch to FDI and offer
less for the trained worker. Since F is one-time fixed cost of doing FDI, changes
in F do not affect firm f ’s decision of choosing FDI or export in the game, instead
11Firms might also expect to have low training costs in countries where borrowing rate is low.
In most cases, this rate can be considered to be an indicator of the cost of firms’ investment in
training local employees in the economy (Maloney (1999))
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it has higher chance of retaining trained worker due to the low wage it would have
to pay for her. These results shift curve (1) and (3) downwards and decrease the
region where technology spillover arises. Therefore, we can anticipate exporters to
switch to FDI in countries that incur low costs of doing FDI, such as countries that
have generous environment for the investment.
Figure 3.4: The effect of an increase in transport cost (τ)
Finally, Figure 3.4 shows the effects of an increase in transport cost (τ in-
creases from 0.4 to 0.6). When transport cost increases, exporters anticipate to
acquire technology spillovers by offering more for the trained worker because it is
more costly to export from the home country. On the other hand, an increase in
transport cost makes FDI firm less favorable to resort to exports and more favorable
to engage in FDI, however, it also raises the wage that must be paid to the trained
worker for FDI firm (f) if firm retains the worker, which reduces the profitability
of engaging in FDI. These effects shift all curves in different directions and make
it ambiguous whether such spillovers are likely to occur. Hence, changes in export
cost do not have significant effect on exporters’ decision to switch to FDI.
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This result is not consistent with previous trade literature in confirming the
predictions of the proximity-concentration trade-off: Firms substitute FDI sales for
exports when the cost of foreign trade are relatively high (Brainard (1997); Helpman
et al. (2004)). Instead, this model implies that when technology spillover is taken
into consideration between multinational firms, changes in transport cost not only
affect exporters but also FDI firms such that it causes ambiguous effect on exporter’s
decision to switch to FDI.
Analyzing a simple parametric model allows us to gain more insights into
the occurrence of technology spillovers in the host country and how it is affected by
specific economic factors. In particular, the model shows that spillovers are likely
to arise between FDI and exporting firms when they are more similar in the techno-
logical levels and when they produce varieties that are rather imperfect substitutes.
In countries that provide generous investment or higher education level for the local
workforce, exporting firms have a higher chance of hiring the trained worker from
FDI firms and switch to FDI. However, I find that the change in transport cost has
an ambiguous effect on the occurrence of technology spillovers.
3.3 Summary and Conclusion
To date, a large body of literature has accumulated to explain the different
forms of technology spillovers from foreign to domestic firms. Specifically, theoretical
and empirical studies examining technology spillovers through workers’ mobility
have stressed its effect between multinational and domestic firms by showing that
domestic firms benefit from spillovers through an increase in productivity level if
they hire previously trained workers from multinational firms.
Stemming from the idea that there are technology spillovers between multi-
national firms through their foreign affiliates, my main goal was to investigate the
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conditions under which such spillovers occur between firms, and analyze how it
affects the decisions of exporters to switch to FDI. Extending Fosfuri et al.’s frame-
work by considering the competition between multinational firms, this paper exam-
ined how specific economic variables affect the occurrence of technology spillovers
through workers’ mobility. In particular, consistent with Fosfuri et al. (2001), I
found that such spillovers are affected by firm and host country characteristics such
that spillovers are more likely to arise when firms have similar technological levels
and exporters are more likely to switch to FDI in countries where costs of training
local workers are low. However, the model showed that the transport cost do not
play a marginal role in the occurrence of technology spillovers and thus in exporters’
decision.
Much opportunity for future research remains. From the idea of the existence
of technology spillovers through labor mobility between foreign firms, this paper
contributes to the literature that investigate not all domestic firms benefit from
technology spillovers in their countries. While this paper focuses exclusively on
spillovers between multinational firms and excludes domestic firms from the model,
I hope to explore how the existence of technology spillovers might affect the decision
of exporters to enter local markets through FDI when domestic firms are present.
In this case, there will be competition for the services of trained workers among
(a) multinational firms that had previously trained workers, (b) other foreign firms
seeking to enter the local market by FDI to benefit from hiring informed workers,
and (c) a domestic firm that looks forward to the benefit from spillovers. These
questions are left for future research.
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